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In Gill v. Whitford, the Supreme Court dismissed a challenge to 
Wisconsin’s state legislative map based upon a lack of standing.  While the 
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plaintiffs alleged that the statewide map violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution by being gerrymandered to asymmetrically 
advantage one political party over the other, the Court held that such 
allegations were insufficient to state a personal, individualized injury under 
Article III’s Case or Controversy Clause.  Since the plaintiffs had not alleged 
that their voting power in their particular legislative districts had been 
diluted, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ complaint stated only a 
“generalized grievance” incapable of giving them standing under Article III.  
The Supreme Court was likely correct to find the plaintiff’s proof was 
incomplete, but that is only because the principal metric employed in the 
case—the much-celebrated “efficiency gap”—is by definition capable of 
identifying partisan bias only in a statewide map and not on a district-by-
district basis.  In this Article, we propose a methodology by which plaintiffs 
can plausibly demonstrate the impact of partisan bias on a district-by-
district basis by calculating the district’s “vote dilution index”: the 
percentage of voters who could be drawn into competitive districts but who 
have instead been “cracked” or “packed” into a noncompetitive district by 
mapmakers.  The application of that metric reveals not only that the 
prevalence of partisan gerrymandering is more significant and, in many 
districts, more extreme than previously known, but the precise degree to 
which each district has been skewed to promote the dominance of one of the 
major political parties at the expense of the power of individual voters.  By 
permitting comparison of the degree of vote dilution between districts while 
simultaneously accounting for the limitations imposed by geographical 
clustering of voters, the “vote dilution index” opens the door to partisan 
gerrymandering claims that the Supreme Court left ajar in Whitford.
Introduction 
The date was October 26, 2017, and the Supreme Court was set to hear 
oral arguments in Gill v. Whitford,1 a case heralded as the best chance to have 
partisan gerrymandering declared unconstitutional in a generation, if not in 
the history of the Court.2  The plaintiffs had persuaded a three-judge district 
court in Wisconsin to throw out the state’s legislative map for failing a newly 
minted constitutional test, known as the “efficiency gap” test, which 
 1.  138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 2.  See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Gerrymandering Case Echoes in Inkblot-Like Districts Across 
the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/us/gerrymandering-
wisconsin-pennsylvania-maryland-supremecourt.html; Adam Liptak, When Does Partisan 
Gerrymandering Cross a Constitutional Line?, N.Y. TIMES  (May 15, 2017),  https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/05/15/us/politics/when-does-political-gerrymandering-cross-a-constitutional-line.html. 
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measures partisan bias3 by comparing the number of “wasted votes” each 
party receives in a given election on a statewide basis.4  Since Wisconsin’s 
map consistently and systematically made it far easier for Republicans to 
convert their supporters’ votes into legislative seats, the district court had 
found the map violated the Equal Protection Clause.  The questioning from 
the bench left Supreme-Court-vote-counters predicting that partisan 
gerrymandering would soon meet its demise under the force of Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s quill.5
And yet, almost as soon as the starting gun had gone off, the plaintiffs 
were called for a false start.  In a surprisingly unanimous opinion written by 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing because they had failed to establish any individualized injury that 
they had suffered in their own voting districts.6  The asserted injury of vote 
dilution, the Court held, “arises from the particular composition of the 
voter’s own district, which causes his vote . . . to carry less weight than it 
would carry in another, hypothetical district.”7  Thus, plaintiffs who claim 
an injury to their preferred party’s interests on a statewide basis fail to allege 
the sort of particularized harm that is required to have standing to bring a suit 
in federal court.8  As the Court put it, “[a] plaintiff who complains of 
gerrymandering, but who does not live in a gerrymandered district, ‘assert[s] 
only a generalized grievance against governmental conduct of which he or 
she does not approve.’”9
 3.  Throughout this Article, we, joining the trend in the wider literature on the subject of 
gerrymandering, use the term “bias” to refer to statewide asymmetry between the percentage of 
votes won by a political party and the share of seats it earns in the resulting legislature.  See Bernard 
Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan 
Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 10 (2006) (defining partisan bias as 
“the degree to which an electoral system deviates from partisan symmetry”); Gary King & Robert 
X. Browning, Democratic Representation and Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections, 81 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1251 (1987).  We should not, therefore, be misunderstood, through our use of the 
term, to be referring necessarily to intentional efforts to achieve partisan asymmetry, nor do we 
make any normative claims about the desirability of such asymmetry for purposes of our discussion.  
 4.  Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the 
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 832 (2015).  For the simplest and most intuitive explanation of 
the efficiency gap metric we have found, see Darla Cameron, Here’s How the Supreme Court Could 
Decide Whether Your Vote Will Count, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/graphics/2017/politics/courts-law/gerrymander/. 
 5.  See, e.g., Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Cautious Optimism for Challengers in 
Wisconsin Redistricting Case?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/1 
0/argument-analysis-cautious-optimism-challengers-wisconsin-redistricting-case/. 
 6.  Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930. 
 7.  Id. at 1931. 
 8.  Id.
 9.  Id. (quoting United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995)).
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What was needed, the Court said, was for the plaintiffs to point to an 
injury arising from their placement into a district where they had less voting 
power than they might otherwise have.10  After all, the Court stated, it is not 
any statewide bias in a map, but “[t]he boundaries of the district” and “the 
composition of its voters,” that “determine whether and to what extent a 
particular voter has been,” in the parlance of the Supreme Court’s 
redistricting jurisprudence, “packed” or “cracked” into noncompetitive 
districts.11
Taking our cue from Chief Justice Roberts, we set out in this Article to 
address the very question that the Court found the plaintiffs had left 
unanswered in Whitford: “whether and to what extent a particular voter” has 
been “packed or cracked” as a result of her placement on a legislative map.12
We set forth the very sort of district-specific metric of vote dilution that the 
Court demanded (and found wanting) in Whitford, one which permits 
assessment of “the particular composition of the voter’s own district” to 
determine whether the mapmaker’s decisions have caused her vote “to carry 
less weight than it would carry in another, hypothetical district.”13  In so 
doing, we propose a method that permits a voter not merely to claim that she 
could have been placed in a district where her voting power would be 
increased, but to compare the degree of bias in her district to the other 
 10.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930–31.  In this Article, we address only the standing 
necessary to make a claim of constitutionally cognizable injury from vote dilution.  Justice Kagan’s 
concurrence in Whitford left open the possibility that a claim of statewide injury might formulate a 
proper basis for a claim rooted in theory of “associational injury” under the First Amendment.  See 
id. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring); infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.  The majority 
opinion, which Kagan joined in full, characterized any such theory as “speculative” and reminded 
readers that “[t]he reasoning of this Court with respect to the disposition of this case is set forth in 
this opinion and none other.”  Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931 (emphasis added).  Whatever promise 
such a theory may have, we do not endeavor to analyze or critique it here. 
 11.  Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1929.  “Packing” refers to the practice of placing a number of 
voters of one group into a particular district in order to diminish their ability to influence the 
outcome of an election in another district.  Id. at 1923.  “Cracking” refers to the practice of 
distributing a single group of voters across multiple districts in order to diminish their ability to 
influence the outcome in any one district.  Id.; see also Samuel S.H. Wang, Three Practical Tests 
for Gerrymandering: Application to Maryland and Wisconsin, 15 ELECTION L.J. 367, 371 (2016) 
(“State-level gerrymandering is more elaborate than single-district gerrymandering and relies on 
an elaborate strategy.  First, map drawers cram voters likely to favor their opponents so that they 
are ‘packed’ into a few throwaway districts where the other side will win lopsided victories.  
Second, state-level gerrymanders have a distinctive feature: the remaining, more numerous districts 
are drawn with boundaries to yield more-narrowly won victories.  For example, voters can be 
‘cracked’ so that a bloc of votes is split across districts to dilute their impact and prevent them from 
contributing to a majority in any one district.  In this process, the critical requirement is asymmetry: 
the opposing party’s voters must be more tightly packed than one’s own voters.  The net result is 
an increased likelihood of unrepresentative outcomes.”).
 12.  Id. at 1929. 
 13.  Id. at 1931. 
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districts in her state and across the country.14  We achieve this by comparing 
each state’s current legislative map to a hypothetical map with the greatest 
possible number of competitive districts and calculating, for each existing 
district, the percentage of voters who could be placed in such a competitive 
district but have instead been placed in a “safe” (i.e., noncompetitive) 
district.15  The resulting “vote dilution index” (or “VDI”), which captures 
both “packing” and “cracking” of voters, supplies the missing link the Court 
required in Whitford for plaintiffs to demonstrate a constitutionally 
redressable injury.16
Our discussion is divided into three principal parts.  We begin by 
summarizing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the context of both 
partisan and racial gerrymandering from its genesis until Whitford.17  Next, 
we offer an assessment of the “efficiency gap” and competing partisan 
asymmetry metrics as measures of partisan vote dilution and identify which 
of their shortcomings must be corrected in order to surmount the hurdle of 
Whitford.18  We then introduce, illustrate, and ultimately apply the vote 
dilution index in order to ascertain the degree of gerrymandering in each of 
the country’s 435 federal Congressional districts, pointing up the promise of 
the “vote dilution index” as a superior measure of vote dilution after 
Whitford.19
I.  The Emerging Jurisprudence of Partisan Gerrymandering 
In order to justify the validity of the “vote dilution index” as a proper 
district-specific measure of partisan gerrymandering, we first undertake a 
brief review of the jurisprudential constraints imposed on any such metric by 
the Supreme Court’s redistricting case law.  First, we summarize the Court’s 
racial gerrymandering jurisprudence and assess how the elements of 
successful racial gerrymandering claims inform the analysis of partisan 
gerrymandering claims.20  We then review the Court’s few partisan 
gerrymandering cases, focusing on the limitations the Court has placed on 
these claims and identifying the common pitfalls of pursuing a claim of 
gerrymandering based upon partisan bias.21  Finally, we examine the Court’s 
holding in Whitford itself, paying special attention to the requirements the 
 14.  See infra Part III. 
 15.  See infra Part III.A. 
 16.  See infra Part I.C. 
 17.  See infra Part I.  
 18.  See infra Part II. 
 19.  See infra Part III. 
 20.  See infra Part I.A. 
 21.  See infra Part I.B. 
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Court imposed for establishing standing for a plaintiff who asserts an injury 
from partisan gerrymandering.22
A.  Lessons from the Racial Gerrymandering Cases 
So far, the only context in which the Supreme Court has recognized a 
constitutionally redressable injury from gerrymandering is in the area of 
racially conscious map-drawing.23  As the court’s racial gerrymandering 
cases demonstrate, race-based vote dilution can occur in one of two ways: 
first, by “packing,” whereby voters of a single racial group are crowded into 
a single district in order to reduce their ability to influence elections outside 
of the district,24 and second, by “cracking,” whereby voters of a single racial 
group are split among several districts in order to reduce their ability to 
influence the outcome of any single election.25  In either case, where racial 
gerrymandering is done intentionally, the Court has found that it may violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.26  The Court has further held 
that a plaintiff advancing a racial gerrymandering claim must establish 
“individualized harm,” either by showing that she resides in a racially 
gerrymandered district or by providing specific evidence tending to show 
that she was personally subjected to a racial classification.27
Under the standard that has emerged in racial gerrymandering cases, a 
plaintiff can succeed if she demonstrates that “race was the predominant 
factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of 
voters within or without” the district in which she resides.28  If the plaintiff 
makes that showing, the burden shifts to the state to establish that it meets 
strict scrutiny, i.e., that it has a compelling interest in considering race and 
 22.  See infra Part I.C. 
 23.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017); Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 
135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 
(1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Wright v. 
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
 24.  See, e.g., Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 471. 
 25.  See, e.g., Wright, 376 U.S. at 53–54; Wang, supra note 11. 
 26.  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1463.  While intent has been an obvious indicator of 
unconstitutionality in racial gerrymandering cases, its application in partisan gerrymandering cases 
is more problematic, as the Court has suggested that some partisan consideration in redistricting is 
acceptable. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973); see also infra Part I.B. 
 27.  United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995).  Justice O’Connor’s majority 
opinion in Hays states that the racial composition of a district, without more, is insufficient to 
establish a racial gerrymandering claim.  Id. at 746; see also Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28, 30 
(2000) (noting that existence of an adjacent majority-minority district did not provide standing 
sufficient to advance a claim of racial gerrymandering).  
 28.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 919; see also Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1265 (requiring 
district-specific challenges in racial gerrymandering cases). 
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that the approach taken is narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling 
interest.29
One interest that the Court has “long assumed” is compelling is the 
state’s need to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 
(“VRA”).30  Section 2 of the VRA prohibits any practice that “results in the 
denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race.”31  As 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, that provision prevents a legislature from 
pursuing a policy of vote dilution based upon race.32  If a redistricting plan 
can be shown to have done that, it potentially violates the VRA.  To shift the 
burden of justifying the use of race in drawing maps under VRA to the state, 
a plaintiff must show that she is a member of a “politically cohesive” 
minority group that is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to 
constitute a majority in some reasonably configured legislative district”33
and that the white majority of the district “votes sufficiently as a bloc” to 
defeat a minority candidate in the ordinary case.34
The Supreme Court’s racial gerrymandering cases provide several 
important lessons for those who would seek to establish standing to 
challenge partisan gerrymandering as unconstitutional.35  First, the cases 
illustrate that a plaintiff whose voting power has been diminished as a result 
of the manner in which her district’s lines have been drawn suffers a 
cognizable injury-in-fact.36  Second, they teach us that, even if such a 
plaintiff may have been injured, a gerrymandering claim cannot succeed if a 
particular group has no realistic hope of electing the representative of its 
choice—i.e., if it is either not cohesive or not numerous enough to constitute 
a majority in an alternative district.37  And third, as the Court reminded us in 
Whitford, an injury claimed under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
 29.  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464. 
 30.  Id. at 1461. 
 31.  52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (1982). 
 32.  See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986). 
 33.  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1470 (quoting Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50–51) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 34.  Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50. 
 35.  Indeed, the Whitford Court expressly pointed to several principles developed in its racial 
gerrymandering jurisprudence in its effort to explain the requirements of Article III standing.  See 
infra notes 46–47, 57, 81 and accompanying text. 
 36.  United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995); see also Ala. Legis. Black Caucus 
v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (requiring district-specific challenges in racial gerrymandering 
cases).  Whether an injury-in-fact had been established was not expressly considered in any of the 
partisan gerrymandering cases prior to Whitford, as those cases were disposed of on other grounds.  
See infra Part I.B.  
 37.  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1470.  Although the Court has treated this as a merits question, it 
might plausibly be viewed as a question of redressability.  See infra note 128 and accompanying 
text.
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Constitution must rest on the premise that dilution has occurred with respect 
to the plaintiff’s power to affect electoral outcomes in her own district, not a 
political group’s ability to compete on a statewide basis.38
B.  Pre-Whitford Partisan Gerrymandering Law 
Whereas racial gerrymandering cases have provided fertile ground for 
those seeking redress under the Equal Protection Clause, partisan 
gerrymandering cases have largely been fruitless.  As Chief Justice Roberts 
expressed at the outset of his opinion in Whitford, the Supreme Court’s 
previous attempts to determine what constitutes partisan gerrymandering 
have “left few clear landmarks for addressing the question.”39  The initial 
guidepost remains the first case in which the Supreme Court took up the issue 
of partisan gerrymandering, Gaffney v. Cummings.40  Ironically, the issue in 
Gaffney was the precise opposite of the one raised by the plaintiffs in 
Whitford: the statewide legislative map had been consciously drawn to favor 
neither the Democratic nor Republican party, but instead to provide a rough 
measure of electoral balance between the two.41  Justice White, writing for 
the majority, believed the mere presence of political motivations to be 
constitutionally unproblematic: “[i]t would be idle,” he said, “to contend that 
any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a 
reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it.”42
While the Gaffney Court acknowledged that political gerrymandering 
could run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment if “political groups have been 
fenced out of the political process and their voting strength invidiously 
minimized,” it concluded that removal of politics from the redistricting 
process was an “impossible task,” with the implication that it was not one 
for courts to undertake.43  In other words, although the Gaffney Court
suggested that partisan gerrymandering could reach such a level that it would 
be unconstitutional, it  offered little guidance on how to assess or identify 
any such violation. 
 38.  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1470. 
 39.  Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1926. 
 40.  Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).  A key holding in Gaffney was that the 
principle of “one man one vote,” which applied to federal congressional redistricting, did not extend 
to state legislative redistricting. Id. at 741–42.  Thus, whereas the federal rule required strict 
adherence to grossly proportional representation, state legislative redistricting could diverge from 
strict proportionality, so long as the divergence was “based on legitimate considerations incident 
to the effectuation of a rational state policy.” Id. at 742 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
579 (1964)).  
 41.  Id. at 752. 
 42.  Id.
 43.  Id. at 754.  
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The Court’s next foray into partisan gerrymandering came thirteen 
years later in Davis v. Bandemer, the first (and so far the only) case in which 
the Court has recognized the justiciability of a claim based upon partisan 
gerrymandering.44  The case arose from a claim by Indiana Democrats that 
the state Republican party had purposefully redistricted the statewide map to 
disadvantage the Democratic party.45  The Court reversed the three-judge 
panel that had agreed with the Democrats and found an Equal Protection 
Clause violation, but it was sharply divided in its analysis of the claims. 
The threshold issue in the case was justiciability.  A majority of Justices 
agreed the case was justiciable, relying on the rationale from racial 
gerrymandering cases46 that, when an identifiable group “had an insufficient 
chance to elect a representative of its choice,” it could seek redress in court.47
Three Justices, concurring in the judgment, strongly disagreed, arguing that 
partisan gerrymandering claims by political parties should be precluded 
under the political question doctrine.48  The Court fractured further on 
whether an Equal Protection Clause violation existed.  A plurality found it 
did not because insufficient proof was offered to show that the partisan 
gerrymander had “consistently degrade[d] a voter’s or a group of voters’ 
influence on the political process as a whole.”49  The two remaining Justices 
who found the case justiciable proposed a complex balancing test, while the 
three Justices concurring in the judgment would not have even reached the 
issue.50 Bandemer thus provides tentative support for two propositions: (1) 
that partisan gerrymandering cases are indeed justiciable; and (2) that 
proving an Equal Protection Clause violation requires evidence that the 
“electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their 
opportunity to influence the political process effectively.”51
 44.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 45.  As in Gaffney, the challenge was to the statewide map in its entirety.  Cf. Gaffney, 412 
U.S. at 754. The Indiana Democratic Party presented evidence that in the statewide races for the 
Indiana House of Representatives, the Democrats had received 51.9 percent of the vote, but only 
won 43 of 100 available seats.  See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115.  The lower court’s ruling 
invalidating the statewide map was based upon multiple issues with the map itself, as opposed to a 
claim of vote dilution in any particular district.  Id. at 116–17. 
 46.  See supra Part I.A.
 47.  Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 124.  
 48.  Id. at 162 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor was joined by Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger and Justice William Rehnquist. 
 49.  Id. at 132.  
 50.  Id. at 144, 173. 
 51.  Id. at 133.  How to determine whether “certain voters” are disadvantaged was left open 
by the Court.  The type of statistical analysis employed in Whitford and proposed herein was not 
considered by the Bandemer Court.  See id. at 116 n.3 (“A multitude of conflicting statistical 
evidence was also introduced at the trial.  The District Court, however, specifically declined to 
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Those principles were called into question in Vieth v. Jubelirer,52  a case 
in which Pennsylvania Democrats challenged a map allegedly favoring 
Republicans at the expense of “traditional redistricting criteria.”53  A 
plurality of the Court voted to overrule Bandemer as wrongly decided, as 
“no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating 
political gerrymandering claims ha[d] emerged” in the eighteen years since 
Bandemer was handed down.54  However, Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
concurring in the judgment preserved Bandemer, even though he agreed with 
the plurality that no workable standard had yet been advanced to adjudicate 
partisan gerrymandering claims.55  Justice Kennedy refused to foreclose the 
possibility that a workable standard could be developed: 
[N]ew technologies may produce new methods of analysis that 
make more evident the precise nature of the burdens 
gerrymanders impose on the representational rights of voters 
and parties. That would facilitate court efforts to identify and 
remedy the burdens, with judicial intervention limited by the 
derived standards.56
The dissenters in Vieth, on the other hand, all would have upheld 
Bandemer, though each proposed different standards for judicial 
management of partisan gerrymandering claims.  One standard would permit 
a claim that a particular district had been drawn in such a way as to unduly 
burden the claimant’s participation in elections,57 whereas another would 
have permitted a claim when the plaintiff could show “unjustified use of 
credit any of this evidence, noting that it did not ‘wish to choose which statistician is more credible 
or less credible.’”  (internal citation omitted)). 
 52.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 53.  Id. at 272. 
 54.  Id. at 281. The plurality also engaged in a historical analysis, first finding that the Framers 
had vested in Congress, not the courts, the power to override state legislative maps, see U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 4, and then determining that Bandemer must be incorrect because the lower courts had been 
incapable of fashioning a workable standard for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims.  See
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274–81.  The professed absence of a judicially manageable standard, however, 
seems to be the primary justification for the plurality’s holding that Bandemer should be 
overturned.
 55.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 312, 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy agreed with 
Bandemer’s conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment provided the basis for a claim of partisan 
gerrymandering, but further noted that a “subsidiary standard” would likely be necessary to 
establish any such claim.  Id. at 314. Justice Kennedy posited that such a standard would need to 
show “how an otherwise permissible classification, as applied, burdens representational 
rights . . . .”  Id.
 56.  Id. at 312–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 57.  Id. at 330–31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens drew primarily from the Court’s 
racial gerrymandering jurisprudence, see supra Part I.A, in crafting this standard.  
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political factors to entrench a minority in power.”58  Unlike Gaffney and 
Bandemer, the proposed standards required showing harm by an individual 
claimant on a district-specific level, rather than a more generalized harm 
arising from a statewide map, in order to establish a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
The Court’s final partisan gerrymandering decision prior to Whitford
was League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry.59  After 
setting aside the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering cases,60 the Court 
turned once again to whether a judicially manageable standard had been 
established.  The Court specifically took up an argument from an amicus 
brief, which had proposed a “symmetry standard” that measured the bias 
inherent in a map based upon “the extent to which a majority party would 
fare better than the minority party, should their respective shares of the vote 
reverse.”61  In other words, if the Democratic Party were to receive 55 
percent of the vote and 70 percent of the legislative seats, this result would 
reflect partisan bias only if the Republican party would obtain more or less 
than 70 percent of the seats when receiving 55 percent of the vote.62  The 
Court rejected this standard, finding it too speculative and reliant on 
counterfactuals, and holding that any workable standard must be rooted in 
actual harm to particular voters or voting groups.63  The Court stressed that 
the partisan symmetry standard failed to answer the fundamental question of 
“how much partisan dominance is too much.”64  As a result, it found the 
plaintiffs had established “no legally impermissible use of political 
classifications” in the redistricting at issue.65
The pre-Whitford jurisprudence, muddled as it is, sheds light on how 
the Court is likely to evaluate partisan gerrymandering claims going forward.  
First, although the Court has held these claims justiciable, the Court will be 
unlikely to grant relief until it is able to articulate a judicially manageable 
 58.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 360–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 59.  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) [hereinafter LULAC]. 
 60.  Id. at 413–14.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined the Court’s disposition on 
the issue of justiciability because it had not been argued in the instant case, potentially leaving the 
door open to a justiciability challenge in the future.  Whitford did not reach the issue.  See Gill v. 
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018).
 61.  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 419–20.  
62.  See Brief for Gary King, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, at 5, LULAC, 
548 U.S. 399 (2006), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legalwork/Brief_Amici_C 
uriae_Professors_King_Grofman_Gelman_Katz.pdf. 
 63.  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420.  The Court specifically noted that it was “wary of adopting a 
constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair results that would occur in a 
hypothetical state of affairs.”  Id.
 64.  Id.
 65.  Id. at 423. 
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standard for assessing claims of partisan gerrymandering.  Second, any such 
proposed standard would need to establish a significant burden on 
representational rights, and do so in a manner that courts could readily 
administer.  Finally, since a showing of actual harm is required, a standard 
that employs speculative counterfactual analyses is likely too attenuated 
from actual harm to provide a workable standard. 
C. Whitford and the Supreme Court Debut of the Efficiency Gap
Nearly as soon as it was published,66 the efficiency gap metric67
proposed by Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos and his colleague Eric 
McGhee was the subject of great academic and popular interest.68  The 
authors claimed to have solved the puzzle posed by Justice Kennedy in his 
concurrence in Vieth: the enigma of developing a judicially manageable 
standard for measuring partisan gerrymandering.69  The efficiency gap was 
heralded as the answer to Justice Kennedy’s call, and to the prayers of the 
opponents of partisan gerrymandering.  The New York Times’ Adam Liptak 
declared that Stephanopoulos and McGhee “may have found [the] holy 
grail” in the quest to stop partisan gerrymandering.70  Or so the story went. 
The logic of the efficiency gap was intuitive.  Since political parties 
achieve asymmetric dominance by “packing” some of their opponents’ 
voters into safe districts and “cracking” others across multiple districts, the 
efficiency gap was designed to calculate the degree to which such “packing” 
and “cracking” had enabled either party to more “efficiently” convert its 
votes into legislative seats.71  It did this by comparing the number of votes 
each party “wasted” across a statewide election, either by casting votes for a 
losing candidate, or by casting more votes than were needed for a winning 
candidate.72  By “boiling down” partisan gerrymandering claims into a 
“single tidy number,”73 the efficiency gap permitted its creators to propose a 
 66.  See generally Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4. For the simplest and most 
intuitive explanation of the efficiency gap metric we have been able to find, see Cameron, supra
note 4.  
 67.  See infra Part II.B  (detailing the calculation and operation of the efficiency gap metric). 
 68.  See, e.g., Radiolab, Who’s Gerry and Why Is He So Bad at Drawing Maps?, NPR (Oct. 
2, 2017), https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/whos-gerry-and-why-he-so-bad-drawing-maps. 
 69.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312–13 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 70.  Liptak, supra note 2. 
 71.  Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 834. 
 72.  Id.
 73.  See Sam Kean, The Flaw in America’s “Holy Grail” Against Gerrymandering, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan 26. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/01/efficiency-gap- 
gerrymandering/551492/ (“It’s intuitive and easy to calculate, requiring little more than 
arithmetic. . . . Perhaps best of all, it boils gerrymandering—an unholy mix of geometry and 
demographics—down to a ‘single tidy number’ . . . .”). 
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presumptive threshold beyond which partisan gerrymandering could be 
assumed to be unconstitutional.74
Adding the efficiency gap to their quiver, plaintiffs in Wisconsin 
brought a case challenging the state legislative map as being an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, with the efficiency gap squarely at 
the center of the case as the plaintiffs’ best evidence.  The trial, we are told, 
was something of a referendum on the efficiency gap, with dueling experts 
sparring over its reliability and workability.75  Ultimately, the three-judge 
district court was persuaded to find Wisconsin’s statewide map to be an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, and the case went to the Supreme 
Court on direct appeal.76
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of a unanimous court, 
finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish standing to challenge 
Wisconsin’s map.77  The Chief Justice noted that, while the case had focused 
on whether metrics like the efficiency gap provided manageable standards to 
permit judicial review, the plaintiffs had overlooked the need to first 
establish a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy before the 
court.78  Reminding the plaintiffs that “[a] federal court is not a forum for 
generalized grievances,”79 the Chief Justice wrote that “a plaintiff who 
complains of gerrymandering, but who does not live in a gerrymandered 
district, asserts only a generalized grievance against governmental conduct 
of which he or she does not approve.”80  The Chief Justice said that the right 
to vote, being “individual and personal in nature,” requires a voter to allege 
a “disadvantage to the voter as an individual” resulting “from the boundaries 
of the particular district in which he resides.”81
 74.  Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 896. 
 75.  Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 859–62 (W.D. Wisc. 2016) (summarizing 
testimony of four experts who presented evidence of possible partisan bias in Wisconsin’s state 
legislative map); see Wang, supra note 11, at 382 (“In Whitford, the districting plan was evaluated 
using a recently developed measure of asymmetry, the efficiency gap.  Expert witness Prof. Simon 
Jackman established the statistical properties of the efficiency gap in a presentation that included 
36 figures.  This report was challenged by the state’s expert witness, who focused on the question 
of how much asymmetry came from population clustering; that expert was, in turn, counter-
challenged.”). 
 76.  Cases involving redistricting are among the limited set of cases for which the Supreme 
Court has direct, mandatory appellate jurisdiction by statute.  28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2018). 
 77.  Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018). 
 78.  Id. at 1932 (noting that, while some plaintiffs had alleged personal injuries-in-fact, “[a]s 
the proceedings in the District Court progressed to trial, the plaintiffs failed to meaningfully pursue 
their allegations of individual harm”).  
 79.  Id. at 1929 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 80.  Id. at 1930. 
 81.  Id. at 1929–30 (internal quotations, emendations, and citations omitted).  This holding 
echoes the rationale employed by the Court in its analysis of standing in racial gerrymandering 
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 59 Side B      12/07/2018   13:09:16
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 59 Side B      12/07/2018   13:09:16
FINNERAN_USE THIS ONE FINAL 12.7.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2018 10:40 AM 
398 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:2 
Thus, the Court held, any claim of partisan vote dilution must be alleged 
on a per-district basis.82  The Chief Justice drew an analogy to the Court’s 
racial gerrymandering cases, in which a plaintiff has standing “to assert only 
that his own district has been . . . gerrymandered,”83 and in which complaints 
therefore “must proceed district-by-district” rather than on a statewide 
basis.84  Likewise, the Chief Justice said partisan gerrymandering claims 
must be based on an assertion that “the particular composition of the voter’s 
own district [has caused] his vote—having been packed or cracked—to carry 
less weight than it would carry in another, hypothetical district.”85  Because 
the Court found the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate an injury of this sort, 
it left “for another day consideration of other possible theories of harm . . . 
and whether those theories might present justiciable claims giving rise to 
statewide remedies.”86
The Chief Justice also took the time to point to the deficiencies of the 
efficiency gap as a method of detecting the sort of district-specific injury 
required by the Court’s standing jurisprudence.  Putting aside technical 
objections to the metric’s utility,87 the Chief Justice succinctly summarized 
the limitations of the efficiency gap and other measures of partisan 
asymmetry as evidence of individualized harm: 
The difficulty for standing purposes is that these calculations 
are an average measure.  They do not address the effect that a 
gerrymander has on the votes of particular citizens.  Partisan-
asymmetry metrics such as the efficiency gap measure 
something else entirely: the effect that a gerrymander has on 
the fortunes of political parties. 
Consider the situation of Professor Whitford, who lives in 
District 76, where, defendants contend, Democrats are 
“naturally” packed due to their geographic concentration, with 
cases. See supra Part I.A; United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995); Sinkfield v. Kelley, 
531 U.S. 28, 30 (2000).  
 82.  Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930 (“To the extent the plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the dilution of 
their votes, that injury is district specific.  An individual voter in Wisconsin is placed in a single 
district.  He votes for a single representative.  The boundaries of the district, and the composition 
of its voters, determine whether and to what extent a particular voter is packed or cracked.”). 
83.  Id.
 84.  Id.
 85.  Id. at 1931; cf. id. at 1935 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“The harm of vote dilution . . . arises 
when an election practice—most commonly, the drawing of district lines—devalues one citizen’s 
vote as compared to others.”). 
 86.  Id. at 1931. 
 87.  See infra Part II.B. 
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that of plaintiff Mary Lynne Donohue, who lives in Assembly 
District 26 in Sheboygan, where Democrats like her have 
allegedly been deliberately cracked.  By all accounts, Act 43 
has not affected Whitford’s individual vote for his Assembly 
representative—even plaintiffs’ own demonstration map 
resulted in a virtually identical district for him.  Donohue, on 
the other hand, alleges that Act 43 burdened her individual 
vote.  Yet neither the efficiency gap nor the other measures of 
partisan asymmetry offered by the plaintiffs are capable of 
telling the difference between what Act 43 did to Whitford and 
what it did to Donohue.  The single statewide measure of 
partisan advantage delivered by the efficiency gap treats 
Whitford and Donohue as indistinguishable, even though their 
individual situations are quite different.88
The Court declined to enter judgment for the defendants, electing, in 
light of the unclarity of the record before it, to remand for further proceedings 
in which the plaintiffs could seek to demonstrate district-specific harms to 
their individual rights to vote.89
Justice Elena Kagan concurred in order to elaborate on what would be 
required for plaintiffs to establish an injury under the Court’s standing 
doctrine.90  As Justice Kagan explained, a plaintiff claiming vote dilution 
must show that, because she lives in a “packed” or “cracked” district, her 
vote “carries less weight—has less consequence—than it would under a 
neutrally drawn map.”91  If, Justice Kagan posited, a plaintiff were able to 
show that, on a map drawn according to nonpartisan criteria, she would 
reside in a substantially more competitive district, such evidence would be 
adequate for her to establish the sort of injury necessary for her to have 
 88.  Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1933.  We dare say that the metric we propose solves precisely 
the problem the Chief Justice identified in Whitford. See infra Part III. 
 89.  Id. at 1934, 1941.  Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, concurred 
in the entirety of the Court’s opinion, except its decision to remand the case rather than dismiss it. 
 90.  Id. at 1934 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 91.  Id. at 1936.  
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standing.92  Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor concurred, leaving 
them one vote shy of a majority.93
Although it portrays itself as a straightforward application of the 
Supreme Court’s standing doctrine (and it is), Whitford reveals a deep chasm 
of difference between the approaches taken heretofore by social scientists, 
which, like the efficiency gap, aim to detect systemic partisan bias,94 and the 
approach evidently preferred by a unanimous Supreme Court.  Whitford
reminds us that the injury the Court might plausibly remedy in a 
gerrymandering case is not a mere imbalance in statewide partisan 
efficiency, but rather the cause of that imbalance: the dilution of individual 
votes.95  While that change in focus may not make evidence of statewide 
partisan asymmetry totally irrelevant, after Whitford, it is not dispositive, nor 
perhaps even necessary.  As we explain below, substantial vote dilution often 
occurs in systems with modest or no partisan asymmetry, as where the major 
parties conspire to draw maps that minimize the number of contests in which 
they will have to compete against each other to win, and the efficiency gap 
is therefore markedly underinclusive as a measure of vote dilution.96  After 
Whitford, these “balanced” but noncompetitive maps too are up for grabs. 
II.  Meeting the Demands of Whitford 
Whitford reminds us that, regardless of the potential merit of the 
efficiency gap as a method of measuring the overall partisan bias in a 
statewide map, it is definitionally incapable of identifying a district-specific 
injury.97  It is therefore necessary to develop some method of articulating a 
district-specific injury from partisan gerrymandering that is at least sufficient 
to show an “injury-in-fact” that would allow plaintiffs to get in the 
courthouse door.98  Once such an injury is identified, the efficiency gap and 
 92.  Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1936 (“For example, a Democratic plaintiff living in a 75%-
Democratic district could prove she was packed by presenting a different map, drawn without a 
focus on partisan advantage, that would place her in a 60%-Democratic district.  Or conversely, a 
Democratic plaintiff residing in a 35%-Democratic district could prove she was cracked by offering 
an alternative, neutrally drawn map putting her in a 50-50 district.  The precise numbers are of no 
import.  The point is that the plaintiff can show, through drawing alternative district lines, that 
partisan-based packing or cracking diluted her vote.”).  
 93.  Id. at 1934.  
 94.  See Grofman & King, supra note 3, at 6 (“Social scientists have long recognized partisan 
symmetry as the appropriate way to define partisan fairness in the American system of plurality-
based elections, and for many years such a view has been virtually a consensus position of the 
scholarly community.”). 
 95.  Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930. 
 96.  See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 97.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930. 
 98.  Id.
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other metrics may be utilized to meet the burden of showing a constitutional 
violation on the merits, but establishing a plaintiff’s standing is an 
ineluctable first step.99
This Part begins by summarizing the demands that Whitford and the 
Court’s standing doctrine in general will place upon plaintiffs who seek to 
have a map declared to have been unconstitutionally gerrymandered.100  We 
then turn our microscope on the efficiency gap and competing measures of 
partisan asymmetry, exploring their strengths and their deficits, both as a 
means of establishing partisan asymmetry and as a tool for demonstrating a 
personalized injury arising from an allegedly unconstitutional map.101
A.  Criteria for an Acceptable Measure of Standing After Whitford
Any metric that would seek to establish standing for a plaintiff must, 
after Whitford, measure a district-specific injury.102  In other words, it must 
show that a plaintiff has personally suffered vote dilution as a result of the 
manner in which the legislature has chosen to the draw the legislative map.103
A metric that, like the efficiency gap, merely identifies a statewide imbalance 
in voting power between the political parties will therefore fail to surpass 
that bar.104
Whitford’s rule rests upon well-settled principles of the Court’s 
standing jurisprudence.105  Those principles tell us that, in order for a case to 
present a “case or controversy” under Article III of the Constitution, a 
plaintiff must show an “injury-in-fact” that is traceable to the conduct of the 
defendants and which could be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.106
 99.  See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 856 (comparing the efficiency gap to 
partisan bias, a competing measure of partisan asymmetry).
 100.  See infra Part II.A. 
 101.  See infra Part II.B. 
 102.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930. 
 103.  See id. at 1930 (requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a “disadvantage to the voter as an 
individual” resulting from “the boundaries of the particular district in which he resides”). 
 104.  See id. at 1930–31.  The efficiency gap is not alone in its emphasis on statewide partisan 
asymmetry, an analytical focus that is nearly uniform in academic literature on the subject of 
partisan gerrymandering.  See Grofman & King, supra note 3, at 6 (“Social scientists have long 
recognized partisan symmetry as the appropriate way to define partisan fairness in the American 
system of plurality-based elections, and for many years such a view has been virtually a consensus 
position of the scholarly community.”).  For the same reason, many other proposed methods that 
seek to measure gerrymandering as a function of statewide partisan asymmetry will likely be 
deemed constitutionally insufficient measures of vote dilution after Whitford.
 105.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 106.  Id. at 560–61 (“[O]ur cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum 
of standing contains three elements.  First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.  Second, there must be a causal connection between the 
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To establish an injury, a plaintiff must point to an alleged harm that is 
personal to him and which is therefore, in the language of the Court, more 
than a mere “generalized grievance.”107  The injury must also be “concrete 
and particularized,” a qualification designed to exclude claims that are based 
upon abstract harms that are not readily susceptible to judicial redress.108
An adequate measure of district-specific vote dilution, therefore, cannot 
be based simply on the fact that a voter finds herself in a political minority 
in any particular legislative district.  If, because the constraints imposed by 
geography and population distribution patterns, the voter cannot be drawn 
into a district where she would have a realistic chance of electing the 
representative of her choice, then her “injury” can neither be said to be 
traceable to the conduct of the mapmaker nor redressable by a court.109  If 
she is harmed at all, her harm arises because of the location in which she 
resides and not because of any action taken by any putative defendant.110
injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action 
of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the 
court.  Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed 
by a favorable decision.” (internal quotations and emendations omitted)). 
 107.  See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179–80 (1974) (restating the “basic 
principle” that “to invoke judicial power the claimant must have a ‘personal stake in the outcome,’ 
or a ‘particular, concrete injury,’ or ‘a direct injury’; in short, something more than ‘generalized 
grievances’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 108.  See Warth v. Seiden, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (“Absent the necessary allegations of 
demonstrable, particularized injury, there can be no confidence of a real need to exercise the power 
of judicial review or that relief can be framed no broader than required by the precise facts to which 
the court’s ruling would be applied.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
 109.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1932 (noting that the lead plaintiff, even under the plaintiffs’ 
proposed alternative map, would still reside in a district with an overwhelming Democratic 
majority); see also Bruce E. Cain et al., A Reasonable Bias Approach to Gerrymandering: Using 
Automated Plan Generation to Evaluate Redistricting Proposals, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1521, 
1531–32 (2018) (“While the Court could take the view that a constitutional partisan 
gerrymandering doctrine ought to correct for imbalances in the way partisans are distributed across 
space, it is more likely that the Court will find that natural gerrymanders are a permissible price of 
redistricting regime . . . . [A] high-functioning measure of partisan effect must be able not only to 
parse out natural gerrymanders from unnatural ones, but also to quantify the effects of each.”); cf. 
infra Part III (proposing a metric that would quantify the effects of partisan gerrymanders while 
accounting for geographic limitations). 
 110.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1933 (“Consider the situation of Professor Whitford, who lives 
in District 76, where, defendants contend, Democrats are ‘naturally’ packed due to their geographic 
concentration . . . . By all accounts, Act 43 has not affected Whitford’s individual vote for his 
Assembly representative—even plaintiffs’ own demonstration map resulted in a virtually identical 
district for him.”).  The inability to account for the challenges presented by an uneven geographic 
distribution of partisan preference is an endemic problem among most existing measures of partisan 
asymmetry. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 11, at 381–82 (noting that two of the author’s proposed 
tests “are oriented towards the outcomes of elections rather than the specifics of map boundaries” 
and “do not rely on geographically oriented approaches which require normative assumptions of 
what constitutes good districting procedure”). 
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A proper measure of district-specific vote dilution must instead permit 
a plaintiff to claim that, if not for the partisan effect resulting from her 
district’s specific lines, her voting power would be increased, i.e., that under 
a more competitive map, she would have a substantially greater chance of 
her vote impacting electoral outcomes.111  Ideally, such a metric would also 
permit comparison not only between the status quo and other possible maps, 
but between districts, thereby allowing a determination of how large an 
impact the partisan bias of a particular map has had on the voting power of 
individuals within any particular district relative to other districts, and 
relative to the whole.112
B.  The Promise—and Shortcomings—of the Efficiency Gap
The efficiency gap is defined by its originators as representing “the 
difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes in an election—
where a vote is wasted if it is cast (1) for a losing candidate, or (2) for a 
winning candidate but in excess of what she needed to prevail.”113  The 
“wasted” votes for each party are added together on a statewide basis, and 
the difference between the two is then divided by the total number of votes 
cast, resulting in a percentage representing the efficiency gap.114  Although 
the efficiency gap is calculated on a per-election basis, it may be tracked over 
time to determine the degree to which any partisan bias is a structural, as 
opposed to merely incidental, consequence of a particular map.115
The efficiency gap presents two major advantages that make it a leading 
candidate as a measure of partisan bias.  First, as its originators point out, it 
“avoids the need to estimate hypothetical election results”; rather, “[t]he 
parties’ respective wasted votes are calculated using actual election 
111.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931 (noting that claims of vote dilution rest on the claim that 
“the particular composition of the voter’s own district . . . causes his vote—having been packed or 
cracked—to carry less weight than it would carry in another, hypothetical district”); id. at 1932 
(illustrating how, even under plaintiffs’ proposed map, Professor Whitford would still be located 
in a “safe” Democratic district). 
 112.  Cain, supra note 109, at 1531–32 (2018) (“[A] high-functioning measure of partisan 
effect must be able not only to parse out natural gerrymanders from unnatural ones, but also to 
quantify the effects of each.”); cf. infra Part III (proposing a metric that would quantify the effects 
of partisan gerrymanders while accounting for geographic limitations). 
 113.  Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 834. 
 114.  Id.
 115.  Id.  The efficiency gap itself does not distinguish between packed and cracked districts, 
but dissecting the “wasted votes” that serve as its inputs may offer some clues.  See also Mira 
Bernstein & Moon Duchin, A Formula Goes to Court: Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency 
Gap, 64 NOTICES OF THE AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 1020, 1021 (2017) (“If (nearly) all the 
wasted votes belong to the winning side, it’s a packed district.  If (nearly) all the wasted votes 
belong to the losing side, it’s a competitive district.  And if there are several adjacent districts where 
most of the wasted votes are on the losing side, then it may be a cracked plan.”). 
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outcomes.”116  Thus, it does not require analysts to make counterfactual 
assumptions about how elections would have turned out had the map been 
drawn differently.117  Instead, it is analytically focused on measuring a single 
number: the degree to which a party is able “to convert its votes into seats 
more efficiently than its adversary—even if the edge would vanish under 
different electoral conditions.”118  And, since it looks directly at the results 
of past elections, it “can therefore provide evidence of real harm”119 (albeit 
on a statewide, as opposed to a district-by-district, basis). 
Another characteristic of the efficiency gap that recommends it as a 
judicially manageable standard is that it requires only very basic 
arithmetic.120  A fifth grader with a pencil and a calculator could easily 
calculate the efficiency gap for even the most complex map.121  It therefore 
 116.  Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 896. 
 117.  Id. at 855. 
 118.  Id. at 859. 
 119.  Kean, supra note 73.  
 120.  Id.  (“It’s intuitive and easy to calculate, requiring little more than arithmetic . . . . Perhaps 
best of all, it boils gerrymandering—an unholy mix of geometry and demographics—down to a 
‘single tidy number’ . . . .”); Garrett Epps, The Supreme Court’s Choice on Partisan 
Gerrymandering, THE ATLANTIC (Mar., 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2 
018/03/the-supreme-courts-choice-on-partisan-gerrymandering/556661/ (“[W]ith a modicum of 
effort, even a J.D. could understand it.”); Sam Wang & Brian Remlinger, How to Spot an 
Unconstitutionally Partisan Gerrymander, Explained, VOX (Jan. 17, 2018) (“Far from being 
gobbledygook, as Chief Justice John Roberts memorably put it, the simplest statistical methods are 
more than a century old, invented for real-world needs like beer quality control.  And if brewers 
can harness the power of statistical reasoning, surely judges and reformers can too . . . . Some of 
the most promising statistical measures of gerrymandering can be understood by a high schooler or 
even a grade school student.”); Nate Cohn & Quoctrung Bui, How the New Math of 
Gerrymandering Works, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10 
/03/upshot/how-the-new-math-of-gerrymandering-works-supreme-court.html (“Over all, it’s a 
simple measure that elegantly follows the logic of partisan gerrymandering.”).  But see Bernstein 
& Duchin, supra note 115, at 1024 (“Legal scholars believe that [the efficiency gap] will appeal to 
the courts because of its simple, one-shot construction with no technical machinery.  As we have 
seen, the simplicity is actually illusory: a lot of care, including further statistical testing and 
modeling, is required to use [it] responsibly.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Gill v. Whitford, 
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161) (remarks of Roberts, C.J.) (“[I]f you’re the intelligent man 
on the street and the Court issues a decision, and let’s say the Democrats win, and that person will 
say: Well, why did the Democrats win?  And the answer is going to be because EG was greater 
than 7 percent, where EG is the sigma of party X wasted votes minus the sigma of party Y wasted 
votes over the sigma of party X votes plus party Y votes.  And the intelligent man on the street is 
going to say that’s a bunch of baloney.  It must be because the Supreme Court preferred the 
Democrats over the Republicans.  And that’s going to come out one case after another as these 
cases are brought in every state.”).  
121.  See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018) (reciting plaintiffs’ contention that 
“the efficiency gap and similar measures of partisan asymmetry will allow the federal courts—
armed with just ‘a pencil and paper or a hand calculator’—to finally solve the problem of partisan 
gerrymandering”); Brief for Bipartisan Group of 65 Current and Former State Legislators as Amici 
Curiae at 6, 25, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161); Christopher Chambers et 
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 63 Side A      12/07/2018   13:09:16
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 63 Side A      12/07/2018   13:09:16
FINNERAN_USE THIS ONE FINAL 12.7.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2018 10:40 AM 
Winter 2019] FILLING THE GAP IN THE EFFICIENCY GAP 405 
reduces the need for experts to explain complex algorithmic processes to 
jurists who ordinarily are not, by training, experts in statistics, let alone map-
drawing, and promises to tamp down courtroom battles between experts over 
which among the possible maps best complies with traditional redistricting 
criteria.122  As its originators suggest, that means that the efficiency gap 
“could be straightforwardly converted into doctrine.”123
As Whitford itself revealed, however, the efficiency gap has limitations 
which make it an imperfect (or at least an incomplete) measure of partisan 
bias.124  First, as Whitford notes, even a finding of an extreme efficiency gap 
between the two parties does not, on its own, provide an account of how any 
such gap causes a concrete and particularized injury to a voter within the 
state.125  In other words, while (on its best day) the efficiency gap tells an 
analyst that a map is biased in favor of one party, it does not tell the analyst 
in which district (or districts) that bias originates.126  As Whitford holds, this 
means that, even if an efficiency gap is evidence of partisan gerrymandering, 
that does not on its own bestow standing on a plaintiff to challenge the map; 
it allows her merely to state a “generalized grievance” that is by definition 
incapable of supplying jurisdiction to a court.127
While the Whitford Court identified this problem as one of injury, it 
might just as well be viewed as a problem of redressability.128  The efficiency 
gap tells an analyst that there is a problem, but it does not tell her how to 
al., Flaws in the Efficiency Gap, 33 J. LAW & POL. 1, 2 (2017) (“The formula is simple and easy 
to compute: in its simplified form, it can be calculated on the basis of two numbers, the proportions 
of votes and seats won by a party.”). 
 122.  But see Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 859–62 (W.D. Wisc. 2016) (summarizing 
testimony of four experts who presented evidence of possible partisan bias in Wisconsin’s state 
legislative map); Wang, supra note 11, at 382 (“In Whitford, the districting plan was evaluated 
using a recently developed measure of asymmetry, the efficiency gap.  Expert witness Prof. Simon 
Jackman established the statistical properties of the efficiency gap in a presentation that included 
36 figures.  This report was challenged by the state’s expert witness, who focused on the question 
of how much asymmetry came from population clustering; that expert was, in turn, counter-
challenged.”). 
 123.  Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 837. 
 124.  See Bernstein & Duchin, supra note 115, at 1022 (identifying numerous failings of the 
efficiency gap, including that it “penalizes proportionality,” produces false positives in cases where 
a party’s dominance exceeds 75 percent, and ultimately serves merely as a measure of deviation 
from a principle of double-proportionality whose desirability the authors question).  Professors 
Chambers, Miller, and Sobel likewise point to several curiosities and contradictions internal to the 
efficiency gap, which we do not endeavor to catalogue here, but which are worthy of our readers’ 
consideration. See generally Chambers et al., supra note 121.
 125.  Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930–31.  
 126.  See id. at 1933. 
 127.  Id. at 1931.  
 128.  See id. at 1932 (noting that the lead plaintiff would remain in a noncompetitive district 
on even the plaintiffs’ proposed map). 
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solve it.  Indeed, it does not even tell her whether any observed efficiency 
gap is a function of intentional gerrymandering or an unavoidable 
consequence of population distributions and partisan clustering.129  It is 
possible, in other words, that in some states, a large efficiency gap may be 
an incurable ill—and those without a remedy do not have standing, much 
less a chance of prevailing on the merits.130
The efficiency gap also produces a result that might be considered 
anomalous by a Supreme Court that is evidently concerned with identifying 
a district-specific injury arising from vote dilution.131  Because the efficiency 
gap, by its very nature, involves offsetting one party’s wasted votes against 
the other’s, it permits a significant partisan advantage in one district to be 
compensated for by a significant partisan advantage in another district for 
the other party.132  Thus, in a ten-district state where half of the voters are 
Republicans and the other half are Democrats, the efficiency gap is 
essentially agnostic as between a plan that would create ten competitive 
 129.  “With geographically defined districts, the number of legislative seats that a party wins 
is going to depend not only on the number of votes it receives but also on where its voters live. . . . 
A measure like the [e]fficiency [g]ap, which implicitly dictates a particular relationship between 
votes and seats, is therefore guaranteed to erroneously detect ‘gerrymandering’ under some 
circumstances.”  Pam Frost Gorder, You Can’t Tell a Gerrymandered District by Its Shape, OHIO
STATE NEWS (Oct. 25, 2017), https://news.osu.edu/you-cant-tell-a-gerrymandered-district-by-its-
shape/ (quote attributed to Mira Bernstein, founding member of the Metric Geometry and 
Gerrymandering Group at Tufts University); see also Cain, supra note 109, at 1533 (“Knowing that 
plan A has a higher or lower efficiency gap score than plan B does not inform whether the score in 
either plan is more likely to be produced by impermissible partisan gerrymandering.  Without 
knowing about the natural level of bias in any given geographic area, the scores are unreliable as 
even a comparative measure of partisan bias.”); see also Kean, supra note 73; Sam Wang, The
Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/o 
pinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012.html (“Concentration of voters in urban areas can, 
for example, limit how districts are drawn, creating a natural packing effect.”); Cohn & Bui, supra 
note 120 (“Gerrymandering isn’t the only reason one party might ‘waste’ many more votes than 
the other.  Parties can naturally ‘pack’ or ‘crack’ themselves, simply because of how their voters 
are distributed geographically.  The efficiency gap doesn’t distinguish between votes wasted by 
gerrymandering or by natural causes.  That’s probably the biggest practical limitation of the 
measure.”).  This failing is one common to most every measure of partisan asymmetry proposed in 
the academic literature.  See, e.g., Grofman & King, supra note 3, at 7 (“The key to the symmetry 
definition of fairness is that it evaluates the electoral system as a whole by evaluating how voter 
preferences statewide are translated into the division of legislative seats between the parties.” 
(emphasis added)); cf. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931 (“The difficulty for standing purposes is that 
these calculations are an average measure.  They do not address the effect that a gerrymander has 
on the votes of particular citizens.  Partisan-asymmetry metrics such as the efficiency gap measure 
something else entirely: the effect that a gerrymander has on the fortunes of political parties.”). 
130.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931. 
 131.  See id. at 1930. 
 132.  See Chambers et al., supra note 121, at 3 (“[The efficiency gap] ignores political 
heterogeneity within political parties and its application can strengthen extremists at the expense 
of moderates.  It can increase political polarization, and can make the weaker party—which the 
efficiency gap attempts to protect—worse off.”).  
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districts and one which would create five solidly blue and five solidly red 
districts.133  That these two situations could be treated identically by the 
purportedly talismanic test of partisan gerrymandering is more than a little 
challenging to square with any claim of constitutional injury premised on a 
principle of vote dilution, as the Court called for in Whitford.134
There are still other senses in which the efficiency gap’s purported 
strengths betray yet greater weaknesses.  Because it looks only at actual votes 
in elections, the efficiency gap is slow to catch up to partisan bias.  At a bare 
minimum, the metric requires two election cycles to produce enough data to 
make reliable claims about any map’s bias.135  As subsequent research has 
also demonstrated, the efficiency gap is prone to serious swings from 
election to election, which further diminishes its utility as a speedy assessor 
of partisan bias.136  In addition, its focus on actual votes fails to take account 
of the effect of gerrymandering on suppressing voter turnout.137  To the 
extent, therefore, that the efficiency gap is understood to make predictive 
claims about the outcome of future elections (i.e., that they too will involve 
similar inefficiencies as elections past), it requires one to make the 
assumption that party loyalty is relatively inelastic, an assumption that, while 
 133.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931. 
 134.  See id.  This feature of the efficiency gap is not merely an academic problem; it ignores 
the fact that voters in districts where there is insignificant inter-party competition will often be left 
to choose in a party primary between highly partisan candidates who do not represent the majority 
of the district, merely a majority (or perhaps only a plurality) of the majority caucus.  See Chambers, 
supra note 121, at 23–24 (“[T]he efficiency gap does not contemplate that political parties may be 
heterogenous.  This is a problem because gerrymandering can affect not only which parties are 
elected, but also the specific political opinions of the representatives that comprise the 
legislature. . . .  [T]he measure can favor plans that make it easier for political extremists to be 
elected, and which would naturally increase the level of political polarization in legislatures.  More 
importantly, in spite of its proposed application in adjudicating Equal Protection cases, the use of 
the efficiency gap can actually harm the minority party.”). 
 135.  See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 887 (“[P]lans’ efficiency gaps vary 
markedly from election to election.  It thus is futile to insist on a gap of zero at any particular 
moment, because in all likelihood the gap will have assumed a non-zero value by the time of the 
next election.”); id. at 836 (“In many cases, in fact, a plan whose average gap favors one party will 
feature a gap favoring the other party at some point during the decade.”). 
 136.  See Cohn & Bui, supra note 120 (“The difference between the presidential election results 
and congressional election results hints at another problem: The efficiency gap is very noisy.  It can 
shift back and forth from cycle to cycle.  That’s mainly because the efficiency gap emphasizes the 
difference between winning and losing a district.  If you win by one vote, all of your opponents’ 
votes are wasted, and just one of yours; lose by one vote and the opposite is true.  As a result, the 
courts would probably need to look across many elections to assess whether a map is in violation.”). 
 137.  Cf. Cohn & Bui, supra note 120 (“The efficiency gap isn’t great at measuring the one big 
Democratic geography advantage: Hispanic districts.  Here, the Democrats’ advantage is that they 
can translate votes to seats at an efficient rate, thanks to the extremely low turnout-to-population 
ratio of Hispanic areas, which, for good measure, are not always overwhelmingly Democratic.  The 
efficiency gap, if anything, gets this backward.  It’s measuring wasted votes, after all, and the low 
turnout of these districts means that the Republicans waste very few in Hispanic districts.”). 
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it may be true today,138 has been too infrequently true historically to make it 
a plausible constitutional norm.139  As its originators admit, an efficiency gap 
in any single election is not enough to make an assumption of inherent 
partisan bias, and thus they include a series of caveats which one must 
employ before determining its usefulness.140
While the efficiency gap may still have promise as a tool for 
demonstrating the effects of enduring partisan bias and entrenchment, 
Whitford makes it clear that it is inadequate, standing on its own, to sustain 
a claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.141  In the next section, 
we propose an alternative, district-focused approach that would provide a 
court an adequate basis to find an individualized injury-in-fact to a particular 
voter, as well as permit the sort of apples-to-apples comparisons that made 
the efficiency gap an attractive metric to begin with.142
III.  Measuring Per-District Vote Dilution 
This section introduces and explains the metric we propose to answer 
the challenge, set down in Whitford, of demonstrating a district-specific 
injury from partisan gerrymandering: the “vote dilution index.”  It begins by 
setting forth a formula for calculating the index, which is equal to the 
percentage of voters in a given district who, on a maximally competitive 
map, could be drawn into a competitive district but have instead been drawn 
into a district where there is a vanishingly small chance of their votes 
affecting the outcome.143  Next, we illustrate the function and attributes of 
the index using a simplified hypothetical state whose population is both 
evenly distributed geographically and closely divided along partisan lines.144
We then put theory into practice by calculating the vote dilution index for 
each of the country’s 435 Congressional districts and reporting our 
findings.145  Finally, we discuss the advantages of the vote dilution index 
over existing measures of partisan bias, with a focus on its unique ability to 
isolate and identify the effects of partisan gerrymandering on individual 
 138.  See Micah Altman, Modeling the Effect of Mandatory District Compactness on Partisan 
Gerrymanders, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 989, 1000 (1998). 
 139.  See Cain, supra note 109, at 1525 (“While it is a straightforward calculation to identify 
seats-votes gaps at the end of a decade, it is more problematic to project them with a high degree 
of certainty into the future when the districts lines have just been drawn.”). 
 140.  See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 847. 
 141.  Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1932 (2018). 
 142.  See id. at 1935 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“The harm of vote dilution . . . arises when an 
election practice—most commonly, the drawing of district lines—devalues one citizen’s vote as 
compared to others.”). 
 143.  See infra Part III.A. 
 144.  See infra Part III.B. 
 145.  See infra Part III.C. 
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legislative districts, all while fully accounting for the potential distorting 
effects of geographic clustering.146
A.  The Vote Dilution Index
To meet the demands of Whitford, we propose a new metric, which we 
call the “vote dilution index,” that would permit plaintiffs to credibly claim, 
and courts to properly find, a district-specific injury based upon partisan vote 
dilution.  Our metric answers the call of Whitford by providing a method of 
assessing partisan gerrymandering not on a statewide basis, but on a district-
by-district basis, and in a manner that accounts for the limitations imposed 
by geographic clustering of members of one party.147  And, because it can be 
calculated for any district, the vote dilution index also permits comparison 
among districts and among maps.148
Although we explain our method in greater detail below, it will be 
helpful for us to offer a definition of the vote dilution index at the outset.  
The vote dilution index is expressed as the percentage of the voters149 in a 
 146.  See infra Part III.D. 
 147.  See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 862 (2016) (noting that defense expert in 
district court proceeding could not “determine exactly how much of the [efficiency gap] was 
attributable to geography.”). 
 148.  See infra Part III.C and III.D. 
 149.  In our application below, see infra Part III.C, we generally utilize the voting-age 
population of a district as the best and most readily available approximation of the number of 
registered and active voters in a particular district.  Since the vote dilution index is expressed as a 
percentage, however, its formula should produce similar results if other segments are studied, such 
as total population or registered voter population, provided that those populations are as evenly 
distributed in a given jurisdiction.  Indeed, in our analysis below, where precinct-level voting age 
population figures were not readily available, we have utilized total population to calculate the vote 
dilution index.  This was the case for the six states that have redistricted since the 2012 presidential 
election: Arizona, California, Florida, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.  In order to 
include those districts in our population totals below, see infra Part III.C, we multiplied the vote 
dilution index by the total voting-age population of the district in order to approximate the number 
of voting-age individuals in each district whose voting power has been diminished as a result of 
decisions by mapmakers.   
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presently noncompetitive district150 that, on a maximally competitive map,151
would instead reside in a competitive district,152 or, more mathematically: 
I = P lost
    Ptotal
where Plost is the number of voters in each “safe” district who, on a maximally 
competitive map, would be situated in a competitive district (the district’s 
 150.  We do not endeavor here to set in stone a definitive dividing line between  of 
“competitive” or “noncompetitive,” although we believe any reasonable definition of 
competitiveness, at least in the context of federal Congressional elections, must give each major 
party something close to a one-in-five chance of winning an election, since there will only be five 
Congressional elections in the decade-long life of a map.  In our application below, we utilize the 
definition of competitiveness adopted in the models developed by FiveThirtyEight, which requires 
that the minority party have at least an 18 percent chance of gaining control of the district over 
time.  See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
  In setting a proper threshold for “competitiveness,” one must select a definition that 
separates genuinely competitive races from realistically noncompetitive ones.  A district in which 
there is a 95 percent chance of a party maintaining control is not practically different from a district 
in which there is a 98 or 99 percent chance of the same result, at least for a map that will only 
endure for five elections.  For that reason, we do not propose a measure that would simply ask 
whether voters could have been drawn into more or less competitive districts, but whether they can 
be drawn into districts that meet a reasonable threshold of competitiveness. Cf. Grofman & King, 
supra note 3, at 23 (“It somehow seems more heinous to prevent a majority from exercising its 
mandate, then [sic] merely to exaggerate the size of a majority.  Moreover, exaggerating the size 
of a majority is virtually inevitable under plurality-based legislative elections because of electoral 
responsiveness values above one (the bonus effect).”). 
 151.  As with settling on a definition of competitiveness, see supra note 150, creating a 
“maximally competitive map” is both a necessary first step in our methodology and an area where 
reasonable minds may differ as to what constitutes such a map.  As we explain below, infra note
187, we believe that the threshold selected by FiveThirtyEight (Cook PVI +5 for either party) is as 
reasonable a definition of competitiveness as any other.  But regardless, once the mapmaker selects 
a threshold for separating competitive districts from noncompetitive districts, then the criteria for 
creating such a map are clear.  A map is “maximally competitive” under our definition if, for each 
given state, it is not possible to create any more competitive districts than appear on the map while 
adhering to presumptively mandatory traditional redistricting criteria such as contiguity and equal 
population. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577–78 (1964) (requiring roughly equal 
population among state legislative districts and recognizing contiguity as an acceptable principle); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (requiring equal population among federal Congressional 
districts).  Thus, assuming, as we do in our application of the methodology below, that a district 
must have an approximately one-in-five chance of changing party control in order to be considered 
competitive, then the maker of our “maximally” competitive must draw the districts’ lines in order 
to maximize the number of districts that are at least that competitive.  Because it satisfies this 
criterion, FiveThirtyEight’s “highly competitive” map meets the definition of a “maximally 
competitive map” and is therefore used in our application of our method below.  See infra note 187. 
 152.  See supra note 150 (discussing criteria for a proper measure of competitiveness). 
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“population lost” to competitive districts), and Ptotal is the total number of 
voters in the district.153
Thus, a district which is already competitive will have a vote dilution 
index of zero.154 Similarly, a district which, though it is a safe district, has no 
 153.  We acknowledge that our methodology bears some resemblance to the “precinct 
swapping” arguments made by the plaintiffs in Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), a racial 
gerrymandering case, although it has some significant differences.  In Cromartie, the plaintiffs, 
who had challenged a single district as being racially gerrymandered, presented the district court 
with numerous examples of precincts in their district which could be swapped with precincts in 
another district in order to promote racial balance while maintaining a similar degree of partisan 
symmetry. Id. at 255–57.  The district court did not address the plaintiffs’ “precinct swapping” 
arguments, but found a racial gerrymander on other grounds.  Id. at 255.  The Supreme Court, in 
reversing the district court, evaluated the plaintiffs’ precinct-swapping arguments as a possible 
alternative basis to uphold the factual findings of the district court, which it had found to be clearly 
erroneous. Id. at 257. 
  In each case, the Court found that the mapmakers (there, the legislature) could 
satisfactorily have based each of their decisions not to swap precincts on traditional redistricting 
criteria, and therefore, the Court said, there was not a sufficient basis to conclude that the decisions 
were made based upon racial considerations.  Id. at 255–56.  Ultimately, the Court said, “a showing 
that the legislature might have ‘swapped’ a handful of precincts out of a total of 154 precincts, 
involving a population of a few hundred out of a total population of about half a million, cannot 
significantly strengthen appellees’ case.”  Id. at 256–57. 
  As an initial matter, it is important to note that the Cromartie Court did not reject a 
“precinct swapping” approach out-of-hand as an improper method for assessing vote dilution; 
instead, it found that such an approach was not convincing under the specific facts of the case.  
Critically, in reaching that conclusion, it pointed to the relatively negligible proportion of voters 
who would have been affected (a number evidently less than two-tenths of one percent of the total 
population of the district) as one of the major factors diminishing the persuasive power of such an 
approach.
  Thus, while a certain kind of “precinct swapping” occurs in the calculation of the vote 
dilution index (in that it determines the degree of vote dilution by determining the number of voters 
in each precinct who could, on a maximally competitive map, be “swapped” into a competitive 
district), we believe that it is a substantially more powerful metric than a mere “precinct swapping” 
approach.  A “precinct swapping” approach may provide some evidence of purposeful 
gerrymandering at a particular time and place, but the vote dilution index permits comparison of 
the degree of vote dilution across districts and across time.  It also has the advantage of using, as a 
baseline, not a slightly rejiggered neighboring district, but a statewide map that has been designed 
to maximize competitiveness.  Thus, the vote dilution index allows us to determine not merely how 
many voters in a district could be redrawn into an already-existing neighboring district, but how 
many of those voters could be drawn into competitive districts overall.  As a result, the vote dilution 
index permits a court to readily distinguish the sort of de minimis effects observed in Cromartie
from the far more significant gerrymanders detected in our analysis below.  See infra Part III.C.  
 154.  That is true, because in our formula Plost is defined to include only voters who are currently 
situated in safe districts but could be situated in competitive districts on a maximally competitive 
map.  Since voters in a competitive district are not currently situated in a safe district, Plost is zero 
and the vote dilution index is likewise zero as a result.  This result is consistent with the objectives 
of our methodology, because a voter who already lives in a competitive district has not, by 
definition, been “packed” or “cracked” into a district where his voting power has been substantially 
reduced as a result of decisions by the mapmakers.  But see infra note 169 (discussing the utility of 
ascertaining a “negative” vote dilution index for voters who reside in a competitive district on the 
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precincts that would be drawn into a competitive district on a maximally 
competitive map likewise has a vote dilution index of zero.155  A district, 
meanwhile, where all of the precincts could be, but are not, drawn into a 
competitive district, would have a vote dilution index of 100.156  A vote 
dilution index between zero and 100 reflects that some, but not all, of the 
voters in that district could be drawn into a competitive district but have not 
been.
Our method is based upon a comparison of two maps: (1) the current 
map; and (2) an alternative map that has been drawn to maximize the number 
of competitive contests.157  In our application of the methodology below, we 
have used a map developed by Nate Silver and his colleagues at 
FiveThirtyEight to maximize the number of competitive Congressional 
districts,158 but our method can be applied using any alternative map 
current map but who would be situated in a noncompetitive district on a maximally competitive 
map).  On the most recent national Congressional map, there are 72 such districts.  See infra note 
201 and accompanying text. 
 155.  That is true for similar reasons as in the case of a competitive district.  See supra note 
154.  If a district is such that, even when a state map is drawn to maximize the number of 
competitive districts, every voter in the district would still reside in a noncompetitive district, then 
Plost is zero because there are no voters in the district who would be situated in a competitive district 
even on a maximally competitive map, and the resulting vote dilution index is therefore zero.  
Again, this fits with the objectives of the metric, since it can be reasonably assumed that the voters 
residing in such a district reside in a noncompetitive district as a result of geography and not as a 
result of any “packing” or “cracking” by mapmakers.  On the most recent national Congressional 
map, there are 53 such districts, seven of which are in single-district states.  See infra note 202 and 
accompanying text. 
 156.  That result once again follows from a straightforward application of the formula we 
present above.  If literally ever voter residing in a presently noncompetitive district could, on a 
maximally competitive map, be drawn into a competitive district, then each and every one of those 
voters has a plausible basis to claim that the resulting diminishment in her voting power is traceable 
to the decisions of the mapmakers.  That showing is enough to satisfy the first two prongs of the 
standing inquiry, and the fact that a maximally competitive map exists satisfies the third.  See Gill 
v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1936 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring).  On the most recent national 
Congressional map, there are 49 such districts.  See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. 
 157.  See supra notes 150–51 (discussing possible methodologies for developing such a map). 
 158.  See infra Part II.C.  Professor Cain and his colleagues question the wisdom of seeking to 
identify a “single-but-elusive counterfactual” map that can be drawn according to any combination 
of neutral (i.e., nonpartisan) criteria.  See Cain, supra note 109, at 1536 (“Instead . . . the spectrum 
of viable maps better constitutes the baselines or natural set of maps against which to compare the 
observed map.”).  While that critique may have force in the context of determining what degree of 
partisan gerrymandering goes “too far,” we do not believe it is fatal to an approach like ours, which 
seeks merely to identify the circumstances in which a plaintiff has standing to raise such a claim.  
As the Court tells us in Whitford, to demonstrate standing in the context of a partisan vote dilution 
case, a plaintiff must merely claim a diminution in voting power that is traceable to the decisions 
of the mapmakers and which could be redressed by a hypothetical map.  Given those requirements, 
a maximally competitive map sets the best possible baseline to measure and compare the effects of 
the mapmakers’ decisions in each existing district.  
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designed to maximize the number of competitive contests.159  This 
“maximally competitive map” is used in our method as a baseline to assess 
the degree to which voters in each district are “cracked” or “packed” into 
noncompetitive districts as a result of choices made by mapmakers.160
Our method next classifies the districts in each state as being either 
“competitive” or “safe” (i.e., noncompetitive), based upon an assessment of 
the likelihood that the district will change partisan control over time.161
 159.  See supra notes 150–51 (discussing possible methodologies for developing such a map).  
It is important to note that our analysis necessitates no claim that a maximally competitive map is 
constitutionally required, or even desirable.  Courts might well determine that something well short 
of maximum competitiveness is required under the Constitution, and anti-gerrymandering 
advocates on all sides may take different views of what goals should be achieved in an optimal 
map.  While our metric would also permit the current maps to be compared to those alternative 
maps, our purpose in using a map that maximizes the number of competitive districts is to provide 
a baseline for assessing the size of the voting population that is “cracked” or “packed” into 
noncompetitive districts as a result of the choices that have been made by mapmakers.  
 160.  We believe that a maximally competitive map provides the proper baseline by which to 
measure partisan gerrymandering, for several reasons.  First, unlike metrics that look merely at the 
degree of partisan advantage in a particular district as compared to a statewide average, drawing a 
maximally competitive map requires plaintiffs to take account of the limitations imposed by the 
fact of geographic clustering.  Studies show that such clustering has dramatically increased over 
the course of the last several decades, and as a result it will literally be impossible in some regions 
to produce a competitive district.  See, e.g., Aaron Bycoffe et al., West Virginia - The Atlas of 
Redistricting, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 25, 2018), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistricting-
maps/west-virginia/#Competitive (demonstrating that it is impossible to draw a competitive 
Congressional district in the state of West Virginia).  By using a maximally competitive map as the 
baseline, analysts resist the temptation to ignore the geographical (and really, geometrical) 
limitations imposed by the independent residential choices of voters. 
  Other might argue that the use of a maximally competitive map is an improper baseline 
since such a map is highly unlikely to exist in reality, but such an argument badly misses the point.  
As we note above, supra note 159, our methodology does not presume that a maximally competitive 
map is even desirable, much less constitutionally required.  But what a maximally competitive map 
does is set the outward bound for how “unpacked” and “uncracked” a map can possibly be, and 
thus it provides a proper starting point to assess how great a variation from that baseline is reflected 
on a per-district basis.  
  Finally, it might be claimed that our metric is flawed in that there will not always be one 
maximally competitive map, but rather multiple maps that may produce the same number of 
competitive districts and thus, as a measure of vote dilution, it is too dependent on the particular 
“maximally competitive map” that an analyst might draw.  As an initial matter, we doubt that will 
be the case very often as a result of the geographic clustering of voters.  But even in a case where 
that might be true, we do not believe the existence of an alternative “maximally competitive map” 
would undermine a plaintiff’s showing of standing (although we grant that it might weaken the 
plaintiff’s case on the merits).  If a plaintiff residing in a safe district can show that it is possible to 
draw even one maximally competitive map in which she would reside in a competitive district, then 
she has shown both a plausible claim of injury traceable to the decisions of the mapmakers and a 
possibility of redress.  If it shown that she has not been the victim of unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering because, for example, the map nonetheless complies with traditional redistricting 
criteria, that may mean she will not prevail, but it does not mean she lacks standing. 
 161.  As described above, different analysts may adopt different thresholds, but so long as the 
threshold adopted remains consistent through calculation of the vote dilution index, it will still 
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Again, in our application below, we have defined “competitive” in the same 
way as FiveThirtyEight’s methodology uses the term—i.e., to reflect a 
district in which each party has at least a roughly one-in-five chance of 
winning control over the district, and thus where, on average, partisan control 
would be expected to shift at least once during the decade-long life of the 
map—but different applications of our method could use different thresholds 
to distinguish “safe” districts from “competitive” ones.162  What is important 
is that the method used to draw the alternative map use the same definition 
of competitiveness that is then used to calculate each district’s vote dilution 
index.163
Our next step is to determine, on each map, and for each voting precinct, 
whether the precinct is in a safe district or a competitive one.  If the precinct 
is in a safe district on the current map and would likewise be in a safe district 
on the maximally competitive map, it is discounted from the rest of the 
analysis.164  This is because the voters in that precinct would not, even on the 
most competitive possible map, be in a competitive district, and therefore it 
cannot be said that they have been “cracked” or “packed” into a 
noncompetitive district.165  Likewise, precincts that are already in 
competitive districts are discounted, because they by definition have not 
been placed in a safe district by the mapmakers.166
What is left, then, are precincts that experience a change in position 
under the maximally competitive map, relative to the current map, e.g., 
precincts that are drawn into safe districts under the current map but which, 
on the maximally competitive map, would instead be situated in a 
competitive district.167  The sum of the voter populations of these precincts 
forms the numerator for our formula, and, once divided by the total voter 
population of the district, produces the district’s vote dilution index, i.e., the 
percentage of voters in the district who have been drawn into a 
noncompetitive district but who could, on a maximally competitive map, be 
drawn into a competitive district instead.  So long as the vote dilution index 
is greater than zero, then there are at least some voters in the district who 
could be drawn into a competitive district while increasing (in fact, 
maximizing) the competitiveness of the state map overall, and who may 
produce results that permit useful comparison among districts and among maps.  See supra note 
150.
 162.  See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 163.  Since voting results are a reported on a precinct-by-precinct basis, it is the smallest 
available data point that would permit assessment of the partisan voting patterns of any particular 
geographic area.  We therefore use precinct data as our unit of analysis.  
 164.  See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text. 
 165.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 166.  See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text. 
 167.  See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text. 
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 68 Side A      12/07/2018   13:09:16
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 68 Side A      12/07/2018   13:09:16
FINNERAN_USE THIS ONE FINAL 12.7.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2018 10:40 AM 
Winter 2019] FILLING THE GAP IN THE EFFICIENCY GAP 415 
therefore plausibly assert a redressable injury that is traceable to the conduct 
of the mapmakers.168
While the greatest benefit of the vote dilution index is that it permits 
evaluation and comparison of vote dilution on a per-district basis, the index 
can also be calculated on a statewide basis.  To do so, one simply sums the 
numerators of the formula for each district (i.e. the total number of voters on 
a statewide basis who, were the map drawn to maximize competitiveness, 
would be moved from “safe” districts to competitive ones) and divides that 
sum by the total number of voters in the state.169  Performing such an analysis 
allows one to consider the extent to which each district contributes to vote 
dilution on a statewide basis, as well as to compare the degree of statewide 
vote dilution to the state’s efficiency gap or other statewide measures of 
partisan asymmetry.170
B.  Illustrating the Metric
To demonstrate the utility of the vote dilution index, let us proceed 
through a simplified illustration of its application.  Let us assume that there 
is a district, which we shall call “District 1,” that contains four voting 
precincts, which we will call Precincts A, B, C, and D. 
 168.  We do not claim, however, that a high vote dilution index necessarily reflects an invidious 
intent on the part of the mapmakers to disempower voters generally, or to disadvantage partisans 
of either political party in particular.  Rather, the vote dilution index merely measures the effect of 
the mapmakers’ decisions; it does not, standing alone, permit definitive conclusions about the 
mapmakers’ purpose or intent (although it may be strong evidence thereof).  Nor, as Whitford holds, 
is such an inference necessary for plaintiffs to have standing to assert claims based on partisan 
gerrymandering. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1932 (2018) (“[T]he question at this point 
is whether the plaintiffs have established injury in fact. That turns on effect, not intent . . . .”). 
 169.  In order to account for shifts in the opposite direction, one may also calculate the 
“negative” vote dilution index by determining the number of voters who are currently situated in 
competitive districts but would be moved into safe districts on a maximally competitive map.  
Although some such shifts are inevitable in any redrawn map, they are negligible relative to the 
number of voters that would move from safe to competitive districts.  See infra note 183.  Were 
one to then subtract the negative vote dilution index for the state from the state’s vote dilution 
index, she will then produce a “net” vote dilution index, which will reflect the net number of voters 
who would see an increase in their voting power on a maximally competitive map. 
 170.  See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.  
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Figure 1. A hypothetical four-precinct district. 
Let us assume that there are two dominant political parties in the state, 
which we will call the “White” party and the “Gray” party.  Let us further 
assume that the district is presently a noncompetitive district that favors the 
“White” party, and, for the purpose of illustration only, that each of the 
precincts has an equal voter population.  Let us also assume that the 
maximally competitive map for the state in which District 1 is situated would 
include two more competitive districts than currently exist. 
To determine the vote dilution index for District 1, we must determine 
how many voters in the district would be drawn into a competitive district 
on a maximally competitive map.  To do this, we simply perform a precinct-
by-precinct comparison between the two maps.  Let us assume that, on a 
maximally competitive map, Precinct A is situated in a New District 1, which 
would remain a “safe” district for the White party; that Precinct B is situated 
in a New District 2, which would become a “safe” district for the Gray party; 
that Precinct C is situated in a New District 3, which would become a 
competitive district; and that Precinct D is situated in a New District 4, which 
would likewise become a competitive district. 
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 69 Side A      12/07/2018   13:09:16
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 69 Side A      12/07/2018   13:09:16
FINNERAN_USE THIS ONE FINAL 12.7.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2018 10:40 AM 
Winter 2019] FILLING THE GAP IN THE EFFICIENCY GAP 417 
Figure 2. An illustration of the districts into which our hypothetical precincts 
would be drawn on a maximally competitive map. 
We now have all of the information we need in order to determine the 
vote dilution index for District 1.  Because Precinct A would remain in a 
district that is “safe” for the White party on the maximally competitive map, 
no voters in that precinct are added to the numerator of the formula.171
Likewise, the voters of Precinct B do not count towards the vote dilution 
index, because even on a maximally competitive map, they will remain in a 
safe district, albeit a district that is safe for the opposing party.172  The voters 
of Precinct C and D, however, could, on a maximally competitive map, be 
situated in competitive districts, and their numbers therefore do count 
towards the vote dilution index.173  Given that each of the precincts has an 
equal voter population, we can say that half of the voters in District 1 could 
be drawn into a competitive district on a maximally competitive map, and 
the vote dilution index of District 1 is therefore 50.174
An observant reader will note that the foregoing illustration in fact 
included more information than was needed in order to determine the vote 
 171.  See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
 172.  See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
 173.  See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 174.  See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
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dilution index for our hypothetical district.  That is because we identified the 
direction of the partisan advantage (i.e., towards the White party or the Gray 
party) for each district in question.  As far as the vote dilution index is 
concerned, that fact is irrelevant.175  All that matters to the calculation is 
whether the relevant districts are competitive or noncompetitive, not which 
party is favored.  This reflects the reality that vote dilution can occur either 
by “cracking” or “packing,” and that each may produce a similar dilutive 
effect.176
The example of Precinct B above is therefore illustrative, in that the 
voters of Precinct B, even though they reside in a safe White district and 
would reside on a safe Gray district on a maximally competitive map and 
thus would experience a change in which party controlled their 
Congressional district, they do not count towards the vote dilution index 
because their voting power would not increase on the maximally competitive 
map: they are still fated to elect a politician from the dominant political party 
in their district.  While they may currently be “packed” into a safe White 
district and would, on a maximally competitive map, be “cracked” into a safe 
“Gray” district, in either case they lack any substantial power to affect the 
outcome of an election in their district.177
Now let us provide a slightly more complex explanation by illustrating 
the vote dilution index in the context of a hypothetical state redistricting plan.  
Take a state that has been divided into five Congressional districts.178  Let us 
assume that each district contains four precincts with voter populations of 
125,000 apiece, which we depict below as squares, and that the population 
is evenly distributed throughout the state.179  Let us further assume that, on 
the current Congressional map, two of the districts are “safe” districts for the 
White party; two are  “safe” for the Gray party; and one is a competitive 
district.  In the figure below, the color of each square reflects the fact that the 
corresponding party enjoys a dominant advantage in each such region. 
 175.  See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text. 
 176.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 177.  See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text. 
 178.  While we have chosen a round number to simplify the illustration, it is not far from the 
true voting age population of the average Congressional district in the United States, which hovers 
around 540,000.  The average voting age population of a Congressional district in South Carolina, 
in fact, is almost exactly 500,000.  
 179.  This is of course a highly unrealistic assumption, but we make it nonetheless for the 
purpose of illustration.  See Cain et al., supra note 109, at 1530 (“Partisans are not randomly 
dispersed across geography.  Rather they cluster in nonrandom ways, causing redistricting to 
produce natural partisan bias.”).
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Figure 3. A hypothetical state composed of five districts. Regions shaded in 
gray are dominated by the Gray party. 
Now let us further assume that, if one were to redraw the map to 
maximize the number of competitive districts, it would be possible to create 
four competitive districts and one safe White district, like so: 
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Figure 4. A maximally competitive map drawn on the same territory 
shown in Figure 3. 
We now have all the information we need in order to be able to 
determine the vote dilution index for each of the existing Congressional 
districts.  Let us begin by examining Districts 1 and 2.  Districts 1 and 2 are 
districts that are “safe” districts for White and Gray, respectively.  On the 
maximally competitive map, however, the entire population of each district 
would instead reside in a competitive district.  Thus, the vote dilution index 
for both District 1 and District 2 is 100.180
 180.  The fact that, in our illustration, both District 1 and District 2 have vote dilution indices 
of 100, despite being controlled by different parties, points up the fact that the vote dilution index 
is focused on the degree of competitiveness and exhibits no preference towards producing maps 
that favor one party over another.  
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Figure 5. A figure reflecting that the entire population of both District 1 and  
District 2 could be situated in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map. 
In the case of District 3, however, it is not possible to situate its entire 
population in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map.  
Although three quarters of the population is situated in a competitive district 
(New District 3) on the maximally competitive map, one quarter of the 
population is situated in a District 5 on the maximally competitive map, a 
district that is safe for White.  Thus, since only three quarters of the population 
of District 3 would be situated in a competitive district on a maximally 
competitive map, the vote dilution index of District 3 is 75.181
Figure 6. A figure reflecting that only three quarters of the population of  
District 3 would be in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map. 
 181.  Note that it is irrelevant to the calculation of the vote dilution index that the quarter of voters 
who are in noncompetitive districts on both maps are in a district that is “safe” for Gray on the existing 
map, but would be in a district that is “safe” for White on the maximally competitive map.  That is 
because, in either case, their votes do not stand a realistic chance of affecting the outcome of the 
election, and therefore it cannot be said that their voting power has been measurably diminished by 
the decisions of mapmakers.  
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A similar analysis applies in the case of District 4, which is a safe 
district for White on the current map.  On a maximally competitive map, half 
of the population of District 4 would be resituated into either New District 3 
or New District 4, each of which is a competitive district.  The remaining 
half of its population, however, would be situated in New District 5, which 
is a safe district for White.  Thus, since only half of the population of District 
4 would be situated in a competitive district on a maximally competitive 
map, the vote dilution index of District 4 is 50. 
Figure 7. A figure demonstrating that only half the population of District 4  
would be situated in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map. 
Finally, let us examine the case of District 5. On a maximally 
competitive map, three quarters of the population of District 5 would be 
situated in a competitive district, New District 4.  One quarter of the 
population would move to New District 5, which is a safe district for White.  
Since, however, District 5 is already a competitive district on the current 
map, its vote dilution index is 0 because there are no voters in District 5 who 
are currently situated in a noncompetitive district.182
 182.  At first blush, it may seem surprising that the vote dilution index does not pick up that a 
quarter of the population of District 5, which is competitive on the current map, would be moved 
into a safe White district on a maximally competitive map, and thus, the voters in District 5 would 
in fact receive a diminution in voting power if the map were drawn to maximize competition.  As 
counterintuitive as it may seem, we believe this outcome is appropriate.  The vote dilution index is 
our attempt to identify the number of voters in a given district whose voting power has been 
substantially diminished as a result of decisions by the mapmakers.  Since, in an already-
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Figure 8. A figure demonstrating that one quarter of the population of  
District 5 would be situated in a safe district on a maximally competitive map.
Looking at the entire state map, we are also able to calculate the 
statewide vote dilution index by calculating the percentage of the total 
population of the state that is situated in a safe district but would be situated 
in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map.  Forty percent of 
the state’s voter population lives in Districts 1 and 2, which both have a vote 
dilution index of 100.  Three-quarters of the population of District 3 (a safe 
district) would likewise be situated in a competitive district on a maximally 
competitive map, and those voters make up 15 percent of the state’s total 
competitive district, there are no such voters, it makes sense that the vote dilution index should be 
zero for such districts.
  If, however, one wished to use a similar method to measure the impact that drawing a 
particular map to be more competitive would have on an already-competitive district, our method 
could be easily adapted to that end.  One would simply calculate the total voting age population in 
each competitive district that, on a maximally competitive map, would be situated in a safe district 
or districts.  We believe that, for the sake of clarity, this number should be expressed as a negative.  
Thus, in the example above, District 5 would have a vote dilution index of -25.  
  We did in fact calculate these numbers in order to net them out of our statewide 
calculations of the vote dilution index.  See infra notes 207–15 and accompanying text.  As 
discussed therein, however, only 41 Congressional districts have negative vote dilution indices 
under this calculus, and on a statewide basis, most states experience only a negligible decrease in 
their vote dilution indices when their negative vote dilution indices are factored in.  In other words, 
in all states where negative vote dilution indices were observed, there are significantly more voters 
who could be placed into competitive districts who have instead been drawn into safe districts, than 
there are voters who would be shifted of competitive districts into safe ones on a maximally 
competitive map. 
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voter population.  Likewise, half of the population of District 4 would be 
situated in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map, and those 
voters constitute an additional 10 percent of the state’s total population.  
Thus, since slightly less than two-thirds of the state’s population could have 
been drawn into a competitive district but has instead been drawn into a safe 
district for either White or Gray, the statewide vote dilution index is 65.183
Although this illustration involves a number of simplifying 
assumptions for the sake of demonstration, it highlights the intuitiveness and 
practicality of our proposed metric.  Simply by determining the percentage 
of the voter population of a given district that, on a maximally competitive 
map, could instead be located in a competitive district, one can produce a 
single metric that permits comparison of districts both to each other and to 
the maximally competitive map.184  As the illustration further demonstrates, 
a district’s vote dilution index can be decreased either by “unpacking” the 
district—i.e., by moving majority voters in one district into a more 
competitive district—or by “uncracking” it—i.e., by doing the same for 
minority voters in that same district.185  Again, the point is not that a 
maximally competitive map is necessarily ideal, but rather that, by 
comparing any given map to the maximally competitive map, we can assess 
the degree to which the lack of competitiveness in any particular district is a 
function of decisions made by mapmakers (and not merely a function of 
geography).186
C.  Applying the Metric
We have calculated the vote dilution index for each of the United 
States’ 435 Congressional districts using the methodology set forth above, 
using data culled from U.S. Census Bureau data and FiveThirtyEight’s 
 183.  As we explain above, see supra note 182 and accompanying text, we have also developed 
metrics that we call the “negative” and “net” vote dilution indices, which account for the number 
of voters in competitive districts who would be drawn into noncompetitive districts if the maximally 
competitive map were adopted.  Since, in the illustration above, one quarter of the population of 
District 5 (a competitive district) would be placed in a noncompetitive district on the maximally 
competitive map and that population represents five percent of the total population of the state, the 
“negative” vote dilution index of the maximally competitive map is -5 and the “net” vote dilution 
index is therefore 60. 
 184.  See infra Part III.C. 
 185.  See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018) (“Remedying the individual voter’s 
harm . . . does not necessarily require restructuring all of the State’s legislative districts.  It requires 
revising only such districts as are necessary to reshape the voter’s district—so that the voter may 
be unpacked or uncracked, as the case may be.”). 
 186.  See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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publicly accessible data set.187  The results of that analysis are depicted in 
the Appendix hereto.188  A few of the more salient findings are reported here. 
Forty-nine Congressional districts yielded a vote dilution index of 100.  
That means that, in 49 of the 435 Congressional districts, literally every voter 
in the district could be drawn into a competitive district if the state’s map 
were drawn to maximize the number of competitive districts.189  These 49 
districts comprehend approximately 27 million voting-age individuals, more 
than 11 percent of the total voting-age population of the United States.190
Twenty-seven such districts have been drawn to favor Democrats; 22 to 
favor Republicans.191
 187.  In utilizing FiveThirtyEight’s model, we adopt, for purposes of our analysis, 
FiveThirtyEight’s definition of competitiveness, which requires that each major party have at least 
an 18 percent of gaining the seat over time, an assessment reached by reference to the Cook Partisan 
Voter Index (PVI) for the district.  See Aaron Bycoffe et al., We Drew 2,568 Congressional 
Districts by Hand. Here’s How., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 25, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/feat 
ures/we-drew-2568-congressional-districts-by-hand-heres-how/ (“The probabilities of electing a 
Democrat or Republican are based on how often seats with a given Cook PVI elected members of 
each party between 2006 and 2016.  They reflect a seat’s expected performance over the long run, 
across a variety of political conditions.  They are not predictions for the 2018 election, 
specifically.”).  To express that concept in the more traditional frame of the Cook Partisan Voter 
Index (PVI), a noncompetitive district is one where the PVI is greater than +5 for either party.  
Bycoffe et al., supra; David Wasserman & Ally Flinn, The Cook Partisan Voting Index for the 
115th Congress, COOK POLITICAL REPORT (2017), https://adobeindd.com/view/publications/ 
76a932db-5c64-472a-b201-6534a25a6d03/1/publication-web-resources/pdf/PVI_Doc.pdf (“[T]he 
Cook PVI measures how each district performs at the presidential level compared to the nation as 
a whole. . . . A Partisan Voting Index score of D+2, for example, means that in the 2012 and 2016 
presidential elections, that district performed an average of two points more Democratic than the 
nation did as a whole, while an R+4 means the district performed four points more Republican than 
the national average.  If a district performed within half a point of the national average in either 
direction, we assign it a score of EVEN.”).
  We believe this a fair threshold for distinguishing competitive from noncompetitive 
districts, although we might prefer a probability closer to 20 percent, to mirror the number of 
Congressional elections to be held over the life of the map.  See supra notes 150–51.  Were that or 
a different threshold for competitiveness set, it is possible that the voter dilution index would 
produce different raw numbers.  But once an analyst sets such a threshold and creates a map that 
maximizes the number of competitive districts under her definition, the methodology described 
above will still be available to permit that analyst to compare the degree of vote dilution across all 
districts on the current map.  See supra notes 150–51 (presenting criteria for creation of maximally 
competitive map). Because FiveThirtyEight’s “promote competitive elections” map is designed to 
maximize the number of districts that are competitive under the foregoing definition, it meets our 
definition of a “maximally competitive map.”  See supra note 151. 
 188.  See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, 
Ranked). 
 189.  See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 190.  Based upon data from the U.S. Census Bureau.  See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2018) [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU]. 
 191.  See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, 
Ranked). 
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An additional 261 Congressional districts have nonzero vote dilution 
indices less than 100, meaning that at least some (but not all) voters in the 
district have been drawn into “safe” districts, where they would instead be 
situated in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map.192
Republicans are favored in 138 of these districts; Democrats in 123.193  The 
total voting-age population of these districts is approximately 140 million 
people, approximately half of whom would reside in a competitive district 
on their state’s most competitive possible map.194  When combined with the 
voting-age population of the Congressional districts with vote dilution 
indices of 100, that produces a total of 97 million voting-age individuals who 
are living in safe districts but who could instead be living in competitive 
districts, a number representing almost exactly a third of the voting-age 
population of the United States.195
Vote dilution indices higher than 50 occurred in 126 of the 261 districts 
with nonzero vote dilution indices less than 100.196  That means that, in 175 
of the 435 Congressional districts in the United States, more than half the 
voting-age population could be drawn into a competitive district but has 
instead has been drawn into a “safe” district.197  More than 77 million voting-
age individuals residing in those districts could be drawn into competitive 
 192.  See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, 
Ranked). 
 193.  One should not misread these and similar findings to suggest that partisan 
gerrymandering necessarily favors one party over the other.  A district may be safely Republican 
because the Republicans have successfully cracked Democratic clusters into multiple districts—
but it may also be the case that the Democrats successfully packed the district with Republican 
voters in order to reduce their ability to influence elections in other districts.  Indeed, what the vote 
dilution index may show most powerfully is that the parties have sometimes conspired to draw both 
safe Republican districts and safe Democratic districts where competitive districts are possible, 
with a resulting loss of voting power for voters in “safe” districts, regardless of the party who claims 
the advantage in any one of them.  See Christopher Ingraham, America’s Most Gerrymandered 
Districts, WASH. POST (May 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/201 
4/05/15/americas-most-gerrymandered-congressional-districts (“Contrary to one popular 
misconception about the practice, the point of gerrymandering isn’t to draw yourself a collection 
of overwhelmingly safe seats.  Rather, it’s to give your opponents a small number of safe seats, 
while drawing yourself a larger number of seats that are not quite as safe, but that you can expect 
to win comfortably. . . . [T]he point of gerrymandering isn’t to draw yourself a safe seat but to put 
your opponents in safe seats by cramming all of their supporters into a small number of districts.  
This lets you spread your own supporters over a larger number of districts.”). 
 194.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 190. 
 195.  supraId.
 196.  See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, 
Ranked); see also supra note 193 (discussing implications of such partisan analysis). 
 197.  See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, 
Ranked). 
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districts.198  One hundred and three of the 174 districts in this category have 
been drawn to favor Republicans; 71 to favor Democrats.199
In only 115 of the 435 Congressional districts was the vote dilution 
index found to be zero.200  Seventy-two of those districts had a vote dilution 
index of zero because they were already deemed competitive under 
FiveThirtyEight’s model.201  The remaining 43 districts achieved a vote 
dilution index of 0 because they are geographically situated in such a way 
that, even if their state’s map were redrawn to maximize competitiveness, 
none of the voters in that district would find themselves in a competitive 
district.202  Seven of those districts are the at-large districts of Alaska, 
Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming, 
each of which is represented in Congress by a single representative whose 
district covers the whole state. 
Among the districts with positive vote dilution indices under 100, the 
degree of vote dilution showed little clustering, with a more-or-less straight-
line relationship between the vote dilution index of a district and its rank 
among the districts.203  Likewise, there appears to be only minimal 
correlation between which party controls a given district and the degree of 
vote dilution present in the district.  Among districts with vote dilution 
indices above 80, the number of safe Democratic districts is nearly equal to 
the number of safe Republican districts.204  For those with nonzero vote 
dilution indices below 80, Democratic districts tend to have lower vote 
dilution indices than Republican districts, and there are fewer such 
Democratic districts overall.205  As noted above, however, there are five 
more Democratic districts that have vote dilutions indices of 100 than 
Republican districts, but there are many more Republican districts than 
Democratic districts whose vote dilution indices are less than 100 and more 
than zero.206
 198.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 190. 
 199.  See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, 
Ranked). 
 200.  See infra app. tbl.2 (Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts by Rank). 
 201.  See Aaron Bycoffe et al., The Atlas of Redistricting, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistricting-maps/. 
 202.  See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 203.  See infra app. tbl.2 (Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts by Rank); app. 
tbls. 4–7 (Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, Ranks 1–300). 
 204.  See infra app. tbls.3–4 (Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, Ranks 1–
150).
 205.  See infra app. tbls.4–7 (Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, Ranks 51–
300); see also supra note 193 (discussing implications of such partisan analysis). 
 206.  See supra notes 191, 199 and accompanying text; see also supra note 193 (discussing 
implications of such partisan analysis). 
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We also calculated the vote dilution index for each state.207  In addition 
to the seven single-district states (whose vote dilution index is zero by 
definition),208 five other states achieved vote dilution indices of zero: Hawaii, 
Iowa, Idaho, New Hampshire and West Virginia.209  Nebraska’s vote dilution 
index was only slightly worse, at 1.8.210  Of the remaining 37 states, 35 have 
vote dilution indices of 20 or more, meaning that, in those 35 states, fully 
one-fifth of the voters in the state have been drawn into noncompetitive 
districts who could instead be drawn into competitive districts.211  The 
highest vote dilution index by far belongs to North Carolina, whose vote 
dilution index of 77.3 is more than 11 points higher than the next closest 
contender.212  Fifteen states have vote dilution indices of 50 or more, and the 
median vote dilution index across all multi-district states is 35.9.213
Notably, on a nationwide basis, redrawing the maps to maximize the 
number of competitive districts would not result in any voters being moved 
from competitive districts into safe ones in 21 of the 38 states whose maps 
can be made more competitive, and on a nationwide basis the percentage of 
voters who would suffer such a fate is only 1.1 percent.214  On a nationwide 
basis, if one were to implement the maximally competitive map, 
approximately 94 million voters who live today in safe districts would live 
in competitive ones, whereas only approximately 2.4 million voters would 
be moved in the other direction.215
According to FiveThirtyEight’s model, approximately 82 percent of the 
American public live in “safe” Congressional districts—districts where it is 
unlikely that party control of the district will change over the decade-long 
life of the map.216  Thanks to the vote dilution index, we can not only say 
that it is possible to draw nearly half of these voters into competitive districts, 
but also, for each existing district, exactly how many voters could be so 
drawn.217  We believe that this analysis provides the clearest picture available 
of the degree to which the decisions of mapmakers have diluted the power 
 207.   See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked). 
 208.  These states are Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and 
Wyoming. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 209.  See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked). 
 210.  See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked). 
 211.  See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked). 
 212.  See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked). 
 213.  See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked). 
 214.  See infra app. tbl.8  (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked). 
 215.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 190. 
 216.  Id.
 217.  See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, 
Ranked); supra notes 190, 194 and accompanying text. 
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of voters to select their representatives, the very proof the Whitford Court 
required for a partisan gerrymandering case to go forward.218
D.  The Advantages of the Vote Dilution Index
Unlike the efficiency gap, the vote dilution index allows a plaintiff to 
make a district-specific prima facie showing of partisan vote dilution that 
should be adequate to survive a motion for summary judgment on standing 
grounds.219  Our metric drives directly at the alleged injury that underlies a 
vote dilution claim: that an individual voter, by virtue of her placement in a 
particular legislative district, has significantly less power to affect the 
outcome of elections than she would if the map had been drawn to make the 
districts more competitive.220  Importantly, our metric does not seek simply 
to compare her voting power to the voting power of a voter elsewhere in the 
state, since even a map that is drawn to maximize competitiveness will not 
create totally equal voting power among all voters due to the geographic 
clustering of voters of either party.221  Likewise, our method does not entail 
a claim that it is constitutionally necessary that a map be drawn to maximize 
the voting power of any particular voter; instead, it simply provides a 
baseline to judge whether or not a particular voter would see an increase in 
her voting power if the district been drawn to make its elections more 
competitive.222  As such, the vote dilution index does something that no 
 218.  See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018). 
 219.  See supra Part II.A. 
 220.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931 (noting that vote dilution claims arise “from the particular 
composition of the voter’s own district, which causes his vote . . . to carry less weight than it would 
carry in another, hypothetical district”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (finding 
constitutionally suspect an “electoral system [that] substantially disadvantages certain voters in 
their opportunity to influence the political process effectively”).  
 221.  Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1925 (reciting testimony of experts that “efficiency gaps alone are 
unreliable measures of durable partisan advantage, and that the political geography of Wisconsin 
currently favors Republicans because Democrats—who tend to be clustered in large cities—are 
inefficiently distributed in many parts of Wisconsin for purposes of winning elections”); see also 
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 859 (acknowledging that “the geographic distributions 
of the parties’ supporters are highly heterogeneous”); id. at 894 (“[I]n many urbanized states, 
Democrats are highly clustered in dense central city areas, while Republicans are scattered more 
evenly through the suburban, exurban, and rural periphery.” (quoting Jowei Chen & Jonathan 
Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures,
8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 241 (2013)); id. at 884–85 (suggesting that, to solve this problem, “states 
whose plans have efficiency gaps above [the authors’ desired] thresholds would have the chance to 
show that the gaps . . . were inevitable due to the states’ underlying political geography” and 
acknowledging that, if “plans with gaps below the thresholds . . . could not be drawn at all, then 
there would be no constitutional violation”); see also Clemens Puppe & Atilla Tasnádi, Optimal 
Redistricting Under Geographical Constraints: Why “Pack and Crack” Does Not Work, 105
ECON. LETTERS 93 (2009). 
 222.  See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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previously developed metric has been capable of doing: it permits a plaintiff 
to assert a personal injury arising from a legislature’s decision to draw her 
into a less competitive district than she could otherwise have been placed, 
while accounting for the geographical limitations arising from the 
requirement of contiguity and the pervasiveness of partisan clustering.223
While we believe these features of the vote dilution index are sufficient 
to solve the problem identified by the Court in Whitford,224 our metric has 
other salient advantages as well.  First, unlike the efficiency gap, our metric 
does not allow a voter’s diminution in voting power to be compensated for 
by another voter’s corresponding change in voting power elsewhere in the 
state.225  Instead, the vote dilution index compares a voter’s present district 
on the map with the district she would be in if the map had been drawn to 
maximize the number of competitive districts in the state—i.e., to minimize 
gerrymandering.226
An additional (and we believe positive) feature of our methodology is 
that it permits a voter to assert a personal injury even if the party with which 
she identifies controls the district into which she has been drawn, or even if 
she does not identify with any party at all.227  That is because the injury she 
asserts is not merely that her party is unable to gain control of the district in 
which she resides (a claim that would not be available in any “packed” 
district), but that her own power to affect that outcome has been diminished 
to a greater degree than it would be if the map had been drawn to increase 
(and indeed, to maximize) its competitiveness—in other words, that her 
power to change which party she votes for (i.e., her right to vote) has been 
rendered inconsequential by the decisions of the mapmakers.228  Thus, the 
 223.  See infra note 239 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., Ingraham, supra note 193; see also
Aaron Blake, Name That District Contest Winner: ‘Goofy Kicking Donald Duck’, WASH. POST
(Dec. 29, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/name-that-district-contest-
winner-goofy-kicking-donald-duck/2011/12/29/gIQA2Fa2OP_blog.html (awarding a free T-shirt 
to a reader who dubbed Pennsylvania’s Seventh Congressional District “Goofy Kicking Donald 
Duck”); see also Trip Gabriel, In Comically Drawn Pennsylvania District, the Voters Are Not 
Amused, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/us/pennsylvania-
gerrymander-goofy- district.html. 
 224.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1921 (“A plaintiff who complains of gerrymandering, but who 
does not live in a gerrymandered district, ‘assert[s] only a generalized grievance against 
governmental conduct of which he or she does not approve.’” (quoting United States v. Hays, 515 
U.S. 737, 745 (1995))). 
 225.  See supra note 133 and accompanying text; Bernstein & Duchin, supra note 115, at 1021 
(noting that “a lot of packing and cracking . . . is not penalized by [the efficiency gap if] it happens 
symmetrically to voters of both parties.”). 
 226.  See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text. 
 227.  Cf. Hays, 515 U.S. at 745 (holding that a plaintiff must reside in an allegedly 
gerrymandered district in order to bring a racial gerrymandering claim). 
 228.  See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 
24–25, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (remarks of Ginsburg, J.) (“[I]f you can stack a 
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vote dilution index allows a plaintiff to assert a personal injury that results 
either from “cracking,” in which a voter has been placed into a district where 
she is a member of a hopelessly weak minority, or from “packing,” in which 
a voter has been placed into a district where she is part of a thoroughly 
entrenched majority.229
Our metric also serves the useful function of helping to readily 
disqualify claims by plaintiffs who live in districts that are already 
competitive, as well as those who, regardless of how the map is drawn, will 
not be situated in a competitive district (since those districts will have a vote 
dilution index of zero).230  As such, it limits the class of plaintiffs who might 
plausibly seek relief to those for whom there is not only an injury-in-fact, but 
a possibility that their injuries can be redressed, which is a separate and 
distinct element of the standing inquiry.231  In addition, although the vote 
dilution index does not, on its own terms, admit of any necessary dividing 
line between what makes for a cognizable injury (or for unconstitutional 
gerrymandering) and what does not, it produces a full spectrum of results 
that permits comparison of the degree of gerrymandering to whatever 
threshold a court might set as being within permitted tolerance.232  Similarly, 
legislature in this way, what incentive is there for a voter to exercise his vote?  Whether it’s a 
Democratic district or a Republican district, . . . using this map, the result is preordained in most of 
the districts. . . . [W]hat becomes of the precious right to vote? Would we have that result when the 
individual citizen says: I have no choice, I’m in this district, and we know how this district is going 
to come out? . . . [T]hat’s something that this society should be concerned about.”).  
 229.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 230.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1921 (“A plaintiff who complains of gerrymandering, but who 
does not live in a gerrymandered district, ‘assert[s] only a generalized grievance against 
governmental conduct of which he or she does not approve.’” (quoting Hays, 515 U.S. at 745)); see
also id. at 1935 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“To have standing to bring a partisan gerrymandering 
claim based on vote dilution, . . . a plaintiff must prove that the value of her own vote has been 
‘contract[ed].’” (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964))). 
 231.  See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (requiring a plaintiff to show 
that she (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the 
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision). 
 232.  If, for example, a court were to hold that no cognizable injury arises where a partisan 
advantage is only “incidental,” then it could set a minimum vote dilution index of 10, or 15, or 20 
that must be demonstrated before it would recognize a claim.  We do not, however, believe such 
an approach would be advisable, at least with respect to the question of Article III standing.  In our 
view, as long as a voter can demonstrate (1) that she votes in a precinct that, on a maximally 
competitive map, would be situated in a competitive district and (2) that her current district is not 
competitive, she has demonstrated both a plausible injury-in-fact traceable to the conduct of the 
mapmakers and a possibility of redress that is adequate to convey Article III standing.  See 
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1936 (Kagan, J., concurring).  The vote dilution index, however, serves to 
meet the requirement of Whitford that the injury asserted must be district-specific, as well as to 
measure the degree to which the district has been systematically drawn to decrease inter-party 
competition. See Wang, supra note 11, at 369–70 (“In gerrymandered districts, the noncompetitive 
nature of the general election leaves the primary election as the only avenue for voters to affect 
their representation. . . . Since partisan gerrymandering creates noncompetitive districts for both 
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it permits comparison of vote dilution in one district to vote dilution in other 
districts, both within a state and elsewhere in the country, thereby permitting 
courts to assess how great an outlier the degree of vote dilution may be in 
any particular district.233
We acknowledge that, as the origin of its name suggests, 
“gerrymandering” ordinarily refers to the drawing of oddly shaped districts 
for the purpose of creating partisan advantage.234  Our approach, we must 
admit, assigns no value to the regularity or irregularity of the shape of a 
district in geographical terms, and thus it may assign even relatively regular, 
compact districts a high vote dilution index,235 and likewise may give an 
oddly shaped district a vote dilution index that is low or even zero.236  But 
we believe this outcome is appropriate, for several reasons. 
parties, voters on both sides may potentially feel the chill.”); Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1940 (Kagan, 
J., concurring) (noting the view of a group of state legislators that partisan gerrymandering has 
“sounded the death-knell of bipartisanship” (citing Brief for Bipartisan Group of 65 Current and 
Former State Legislators as Amici Curiae, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161))). 
 233.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1935 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“The harm of vote dilution . . . 
arises when an election practice—most commonly, the drawing of district lines—devalues one 
citizen’s vote as compared to others.”). 
 234.  See Nic Cavell, Gerrymandering Is Even More Infuriating When You Can Actually See 
It, WIRED (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/gerrymandering-is-even-more-infuriati 
ng-when-you-can-actually-see-it/. 
 235.  The statewide map of Indiana helps to illustrate the point. Indiana, whose statewide vote 
dilution index is the ninth-worst in the country at 55.6, has been drawn to create two reliably 
Democratic districts surrounding Gary and Indianapolis, with the remaining seven districts being 
reliably Republican. See Aaron Bycoffe, et al., Indiana - The Atlas of Redistricting,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 25, 2018), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistricting-maps/indiana/ 
/redistricting-maps/indiana/.  A maximally competitive map for Indiana, however, would contain 
only four safe Republican districts, leaving the remaining five districts competitive.  In order to 
produce such an outcome, the entire population of the First Congressional District, which contains 
Gary, would be placed in a competitive district, as would 97.1 percent of the population of the 
Seventh Congressional District, which contains Indianapolis.  Thus, despite their compactness and 
regular shape, the First and Seventh Congressional Districts have vote dilution indices of 100 and 
97.1, respectively. 
 236.  Consider, for example, West Virginia’s Third Congressional District, which spans nearly 
the length of the state and has a relatively contorted shape.  It nonetheless has a vote dilution index 
of zero because there is no conceivable map of West Virginia that would produce even a single 
competitive district, and thus the map cannot be said to have caused any meaningful degree of vote 
dilution. See Aaron Bycoffe et al., West Virginia - The Atlas of Redistricting, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistricting-maps/west-virginia/.  Likewise, a 
district like Illinois’s Sixth Congressional District, whose shape may look bizarre, has a vote 
dilution index of zero because its shape produces a highly competitive district in which Republicans 
have a nearly 40 percent chance of prevailing.  See Aaron Bycoffe et al., Illinois - The Atlas of 
Redistricting, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 25, 2018), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistricting-
maps/illinois/; see also Tim Jones & Patrick Judge, Illinois’ Political Map Rigging Takes Back Seat 
to Wisconsin, Others, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.chicagobusines 
s.com/article/20170829/NEWS02/170829860/wisconsin-gerrymandering-case-offers-little-hope-
for-illinois-gop.
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First, mapmakers do not draw districts shaped like salamanders, or 
praying mantises, or “Goofy kicking Donald Duck”237 for the hell of it; in 
most cases, they do so in order to produce anticompetitive effects either 
within the district or across the state as a whole.238  Using simple geography 
as a method of identifying the competitiveness of any particular district is 
therefore too facile an approach: it is political geography (i.e., the 
geographical distribution of partisan preference across a population) that 
determines whether or not a particular district map has an anticompetitive 
purpose or effect.239
But more importantly, vote dilution is often achieved by maximizing 
the compactness of a particular district, and a proper metric should therefore 
capture vote dilution in regularly and irregularly shaped districts alike.240
We see no reason why, at least as far as her standing is concerned, a voter 
may not claim a traceable injury just as well from her vote being diluted as 
a result of her having been “packed” into a compact but noncompetitive 
district as she might from her having been “cracked” into a noncompetitive 
district whose lines resemble a plate of spaghetti.241
Conclusion
The vote dilution index is designed to permit a district-specific 
assessment of the degree to which the decisions of mapmakers have 
diminished the voting power of voters within a district, and we dare say it 
 237.  See Ingraham, supra note 193. 
 238.  In other cases, the lines may have been drawn to promote minority representation under 
the Voting Rights Act, a goal which, while laudable, may have the same anticompetitive effect on 
a statewide map as methods designed to affirmatively diminish the voting power of minorities 
within particular districts.  See Clyde Haberman, The Odd Political Alliance Behind Today’s 
Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/28/us/30retro-
gerrymandering-districts.html.  
 239.  Cohn & Bui, supra note 120. 
 240.  See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 298 
(2004) (plurality opinion) (“[P]acking and cracking, whether intentional or no, are quite consistent 
with adherence to compactness and respect for political subdivision lines.”); Grofman & King, 
supra note 3, at 28 (“Criteria such as compactness and respect for existing political boundaries are 
often used as proxies for partisan gerrymandering, but they are typically not very good proxies. . . . 
The fundamental issue in partisan gerrymandering cases in terms of effects is whether a districting 
plan unfairly burdens the representational rights of a particular political group, not whether or not 
districts look pretty.”); see also Boris Alexeev & Dustin G. Mixon, An Impossibility Theorem for 
Gerrymandering, ARXIV (Oct. 26, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.04193.pdf (demonstrating that 
it is mathematically impossible to achieve both optimal compactness and optimal efficiency while 
maintaining equal population in any redistricting scheme). 
 241.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930; see also Beckett Mufson, ‘Spawn of Gerrymander’
Illustrates the Grotesque Shapes of US Congressional Districts, VICE (Nov. 3, 2014),
https://creators.vice.com/en_us/article/z4qmyj/spawn-of-gerrymander-illustrates-the-grotesque-
shapes-of-us-congressional-districts.
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does just that.242  But the results demonstrate just how profound an impact 
partisan gerrymandering has on the power of voters in the United States 
today.  Were maps across the country drawn to maximize the 
competitiveness of elections, then 117 million more people would live in 
competitive Congressional districts than do today.243  Those voters reside in 
310 of the nation’s 435 Congressional districts.   
That is not to say, of course, that all 310 of those districts have been 
drawn intentionally to disenfranchise voters.244  Nor does it mean that 
maximal competitiveness is a constitutionally mandated norm, or that the 
degree of gerrymandering in those 310 districts has reached a 
constitutionally unacceptable level.  Rather, it serves to illustrate just how 
important it is that plaintiffs who would seek to challenge partisan 
gerrymandering have the tools they need to establish standing so that they 
may raise such challenges.  Although we are not so bold to claim that the 
vote dilution index, standing alone, provides a complete standard for 
declaring any particular gerrymander unconstitutional, it does allow 
plaintiffs to demonstrate both the degree to which their diminished voting 
power is traceable to the decisions of mapmakers and how that injury can be 
redressed.245  As the Court reminded us in Whitford, that is a necessary first 
step before partisan gerrymandering can truly have its day in court.246
 242.  See supra Part III.C. 
 243.  See supra notes 190, 199 and accompanying text. 
 244.  See supra note 3. 
 245.  See supra Part II.A. 
 246.  See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930. 
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Appendix
Table 1.  Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional District, 
Ranked247
Rank State Dist. 
Favored 
Party
VDI 
1 NC 9 Rep. 100 
2 NC 4 Dem. 100 
3 CA 22 Rep. 100 
4 CA 4 Rep. 100 
5 CA 8 Rep. 100 
6 MO 1 Dem. 100 
7 VA 3 Dem. 100 
8 MO 2 Rep. 100 
9 CO 2 Dem. 100 
10 NY 22 Rep. 100 
11 NY 26 Dem. 100 
12 NY 20 Dem. 100 
13 KY 6 Rep. 100 
14 NY 23 Rep. 100 
15 NJ 12 Dem. 100 
16 MD 1 Rep. 100 
17 NY 27 Rep. 100 
18 PA 18 Dem. 100 
19 PA 9 Rep. 100 
20 NC 6 Rep. 100 
21 KY 3 Dem. 100 
22 NY 25 Dem. 100 
23 VA 7 Rep. 100 
24 CO 3 Rep. 100 
25 OH 9 Dem. 100 
26 NJ 4 Rep. 100 
27 CA 1 Rep. 100 
247     Where two districts have the same vote dilution index, we have assigned a higher rank to 
the district with the higher absolute number of voters who could have been drawn into a competitive 
district on a maximally competitive map.
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Rank State Dist. 
Favored 
Party
VDI 
28 MI 12 Dem. 100 
29 IN 1 Dem. 100 
30 MI 7 Rep. 100 
31 NC 2 Rep. 100 
32 NC 12 Dem. 100 
33 CO 7 Dem. 100 
34 IN 7 Dem. 100 
35 FL 10 Dem. 100 
36 ME 1 Dem. 100 
37 WI 4 Dem. 100 
38 CA 6 Dem. 100 
39 GA 2 Dem. 100 
40 NV 2 Rep. 100 
41 CA 23 Rep. 100 
42 TX 7 Rep. 100 
43 CA 16 Dem. 100 
44 IL 11 Dem. 100 
45 IL 14 Rep. 100 
46 NV 1 Dem. 100 
47 TX 9 Dem. 100 
48 TX 18 Dem. 100 
49 TX 29 Dem. 100 
50 FL 14 Dem. 99.9 
51 WI 5 Rep. 99.9 
52 FL 26 Dem. 99.9 
53 VA 1 Rep. 99.9 
54 VA 4 Dem. 99.9 
55 NM 2 Rep. 99.8 
56 TX 22 Rep. 99.7 
57 PA 4 Dem. 99.5 
58 CA 50 Rep. 99.3 
59 CA 42 Rep. 98.8 
60 TN 5 Dem. 98.6 
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Rank State Dist. 
Favored 
Party
VDI 
61 MN 6 Rep. 98.5 
62 PA 14 Rep. 97.7 
63 TX 21 Rep. 96.3 
64 TX 32 Rep. 96.0 
65 FL 6 Rep. 95.9 
66 MN 1 Rep. 95.4 
67 NM 3 Dem. 93.9 
68 TX 14 Rep. 93.4 
69 GA 6 Rep. 92.8 
70 OH 14 Rep. 92.7 
71 PA 12 Rep. 92.4 
72 NC 7 Rep. 92.1 
73 TX 6 Rep. 92.0 
74 PA 5 Dem. 91.6 
75 FL 5 Dem. 91.5 
76 OH 16 Rep. 91.4 
77 IL 8 Dem. 90.1 
78 TX 20 Dem. 90.1 
79 CA 9 Dem. 90.0 
80 NJ 6 Dem. 89.6 
81 FL 15 Rep. 89.5 
82 MO 5 Dem. 89.4 
83 IL 16 Rep. 89.3 
84 NC 1 Dem. 88.8 
85 TX 2 Rep. 88.8 
86 WI 1 Rep. 88.6 
87 VA 5 Rep. 88.5 
88 NC 8 Rep. 88.2 
89 MD 2 Dem. 87.8 
90 VA 6 Rep. 86.5 
91 OH 15 Rep. 86.2 
92 VA 11 Dem. 86.2 
93 LA 2 Dem. 86.1 
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Rank State Dist. 
Favored 
Party
VDI 
94 MI 5 Dem. 85.8 
95 TX 31 Rep. 85.6 
96 PA 10 Rep. 85.6 
97 CA 31 Dem. 84.8 
98 NY 17 Dem. 83.5 
99 TX 28 Dem. 82.0 
100 IN 4 Rep. 81.5 
101 MD 6 Dem. 80.8 
102 IL 12 Rep. 80.6 
103 TX 34 Dem. 80.2 
104 OR 1 Dem. 79.7 
105 WA 5 Rep. 79.6 
106 CT 4 Dem. 79.0 
107 WA 6 Dem. 78.9 
108 IN 2 Rep. 77.8 
109 GA 12 Rep. 77.5 
110 RI 2 Dem. 76.2 
111 OK 5 Rep. 75.3 
112 MA 6 Dem. 74.5 
113 PA 11 Rep. 74.2 
114 MO 3 Rep. 74.1 
115 OH 6 Rep. 73.9 
116 TX 12 Rep. 73.8 
117 NC 5 Rep. 73.8 
118 TX 27 Rep. 73.0 
119 IL 3 Dem. 72.5 
120 OH 4 Rep. 72.5 
121 TX 24 Rep. 72.4 
122 MI 3 Rep. 72.0 
123 GA 7 Rep. 71.0 
124 FL 16 Rep. 70.5 
125 TX 30 Dem. 70.1 
126 CA 24 Dem. 70.1 
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Rank State Dist. 
Favored 
Party
VDI 
127 IN 5 Rep. 70.0 
128 FL 12 Rep. 69.2 
129 MA 4 Dem. 68.9 
130 FL 22 Dem. 68.8 
131 FL 2 Rep. 68.1 
132 PA 3 Dem. 67.7 
133 MD 5 Dem. 67.2 
134 WI 6 Rep. 66.7 
135 OH 7 Rep. 66.5 
136 FL 3 Rep. 65.4 
137 WI 7 Rep. 64.9 
138 AL 7 Dem. 64.9 
139 IL 10 Dem. 64.3 
140 WI 8 Rep. 64.3 
141 GA 1 Rep. 64.3 
142 MD 3 Dem. 63.0 
143 MI 4 Rep. 62.7 
144 NC 13 Rep. 62.5 
145 FL 11 Rep. 61.5 
146 MS 3 Rep. 61.5 
147 NC 10 Rep. 61.4 
148 AZ 6 Rep. 61.2 
149 TX 17 Rep. 61.1 
150 GA 10 Rep. 61.0 
151 LA 1 Rep. 60.6 
152 KS 4 Rep. 60.0 
153 SC 2 Rep. 59.7 
154 AL 6 Rep. 59.5 
155 TX 5 Rep. 59.4 
156 PA 15 Rep. 59.4 
157 TX 10 Rep. 58.7 
158 GA 8 Rep. 58.6 
159 MN 4 Dem. 58.3 
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Rank State Dist. 
Favored 
Party
VDI 
160 CO 4 Rep. 57.8 
161 CA 47 Dem. 56.9 
162 GA 11 Rep. 56.5 
163 WA 2 Dem. 56.5 
164 SC 6 Dem. 55.1 
165 MO 6 Rep. 54.0 
166 SC 1 Rep. 53.7 
167 TN 8 Rep. 53.5 
168 CA 52 Dem. 53.4 
169 UT 4 Rep. 52.5 
170 AR 2 Rep. 52.3 
171 TX 36 Rep. 52.0 
172 IL 18 Rep. 51.2 
173 TX 25 Rep. 50.2 
174 OH 3 Dem. 50.1 
175 MI 2 Rep. 49.6 
176 CA 26 Dem. 49.6 
177 FL 4 Rep. 49.4 
178 TX 3 Rep. 48.7 
179 TN 9 Dem. 48.3 
180 TX 35 Dem. 47.9 
181 AL 3 Rep. 47.9 
182 IN 9 Rep. 47.7 
183 MO 4 Rep. 45.6 
184 CA 53 Dem. 45.3 
185 MI 10 Rep. 44.8 
186 MA 2 Dem. 44.6 
187 CA 38 Dem. 44.5 
188 GA 3 Rep. 44.2 
189 CO 5 Rep. 44.0 
190 OH 5 Rep. 44.0 
191 TX 33 Dem. 42.6 
192 TN 4 Rep. 42.6 
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Rank State Dist. 
Favored 
Party
VDI 
193 MN 5 Dem. 42.3 
194 CA 2 Dem. 42.0 
195 MA 3 Dem. 41.6 
196 UT 2 Rep. 40.2 
197 WA 1 Dem. 39.6 
198 CA 33 Dem. 37.7 
199 KS 2 Rep. 37.4 
200 CA 41 Dem. 37.1 
201 WA 10 Dem. 36.9 
202 AR 1 Rep. 36.6 
203 MO 7 Rep. 36.3 
204 FL 17 Rep. 36.0 
205 MA 8 Dem. 35.4 
206 MD 7 Dem. 35.2 
207 LA 3 Rep. 33.4 
208 CA 27 Dem. 33.4 
209 NY 10 Dem. 33.1 
210 MD 8 Dem. 32.0 
211 MD 4 Dem. 31.9 
212 TX 26 Rep. 31.9 
213 FL 21 Dem. 31.4 
214 OH 12 Rep. 30.9 
215 WA 4 Rep. 30.7 
216 OH 13 Dem. 28.9 
217 OH 11 Dem. 28.2 
218 PA 2 Dem. 27.8 
219 AL 2 Rep. 27.6 
220 GA 5 Dem. 27.5 
221 SC 5 Rep. 27.1 
222 CT 1 Dem. 26.8 
223 GA 4 Dem. 26.3 
224 OK 4 Rep. 26.1 
225 TN 7 Rep. 26.1 
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Rank State Dist. 
Favored 
Party
VDI 
226 MI 14 Dem. 25.8 
227 IN 6 Rep. 24.8 
228 GA 13 Dem. 24.5 
229 RI 1 Dem. 24.5 
230 TX 15 Dem. 24.5 
231 NY 8 Dem. 24.2 
232 NY 9 Dem. 24.1 
233 IL 2 Dem. 23.9 
234 CA 28 Dem. 23.6 
235 CA 5 Dem. 23.4 
236 OH 8 Rep. 22.8 
237 CA 15 Dem. 22.8 
238 IL 1 Dem. 22.6 
239 CA 35 Dem. 22.5 
240 OH 2 Rep. 22.4 
241 CT 3 Dem. 22.3 
242 TN 3 Rep. 21.5 
243 CA 32 Dem. 21.4 
244 LA 6 Rep. 21.4 
245 AZ 7 Dem. 21.1 
246 VA 9 Rep. 20.6 
247 FL 20 Dem. 20.1 
248 MA 1 Dem. 20.1 
249 OR 3 Dem. 19.6 
250 NC 3 Rep. 19.4 
251 NC 11 Rep. 19.0 
252 MS 2 Dem. 18.8 
253 TX 11 Rep. 18.6 
254 NY 16 Dem. 16.1 
255 CA 46 Dem. 15.4 
256 CO 1 Dem. 15.3 
257 FL 19 Rep. 15.2 
258 CA 43 Dem. 14.6 
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Rank State Dist. 
Favored 
Party
VDI 
259 WI 2 Dem. 14.6 
260 UT 3 Rep. 14.5 
261 CA 11 Dem. 14.4 
262 NY 7 Dem. 14.2 
263 MS 1 Rep. 13.9 
264 IL 9 Dem. 13.8 
265 MN 7 Rep. 13.2 
266 CA 19 Dem. 12.9 
267 MA 5 Dem. 12.6 
268 NJ 1 Dem. 12.0 
269 VA 8 Dem. 12.0 
270 TX 4 Rep. 11.9 
271 MI 13 Dem. 11.1 
272 NJ 9 Dem. 10.9 
273 PA 13 Rep. 10.9 
274 TN 6 Rep. 10.3 
275 AR 4 Rep. 10.2 
276 IL 5 Dem. 9.1 
277 NM 1 Dem. 8.8 
278 IL 15 Rep. 8.0 
279 AZ 8 Rep. 8.0 
280 TX 16 Dem. 7.6 
281 NJ 10 Dem. 7.6 
282 SC 7 Rep. 7.3 
283 AZ 3 Dem. 6.8 
284 TX 8 Rep. 6.8 
285 MS 4 Rep. 5.9 
286 AZ 5 Rep. 5.7 
287 AZ 4 Rep. 5.6 
288 FL 24 Dem. 5.6 
289 NE 1 Rep. 5.2 
290 KS 1 Rep. 5.2 
291 NJ 8 Dem. 4.9 
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Rank State Dist. 
Favored 
Party
VDI 
292 IL 4 Dem. 4.3 
293 NY 6 Dem. 3.7 
294 PA 16 Rep. 3.4 
295 CA 20 Dem. 2.8 
296 CA 44 Dem. 2.3 
297 GA 9 Rep. 2.3 
298 NY 5 Dem. 2.2 
299 AL 4 Rep. 1.3 
300 FL 23 Dem. 1.0 
301 MO 8 Rep. 0.5 
302 CA 29 Dem. 0.4 
303 CA 51 Dem. 0.4 
304 FL 1 Rep. 0.3 
305 CA 30 Dem. 0.3 
306 LA 5 Rep. 0.3 
307 CA 18 Dem. 0.2 
308 CA 17 Dem. 0.1 
309 WA 9 Dem. 0.1 
310 FL 8 Rep. 0.1 
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Table 3. Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional 
Districts, Ranked by Party
Safe Democratic District Safe Republican District
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Table 4. Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, 
Ranks  1?75
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Table 5. Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, 
Ranks  76?150
Safe Democratic District Safe Republican District
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Table 8.  Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked 
Rank State VDI 
Neg.
VDI248
Net
VDI249
1 NC 77.3 - 77.3 
2 NM 66.1 - 66.1 
3 VA 63.3 - 63.3 
4 MO 62.5 - 62.5 
5 MD 62.2 - 62.2 
6 WI 62.0 - 62.0 
248 See supra notes 169, 182, 187. 
249 See supra notes 169, 182, 187. 
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Table 6. Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, 
Ranks  151?225
Safe Democratic District Safe Republican District
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Table 7. Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, 
Ranks  226?300
Safe Democratic District Safe Republican District
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Rank State VDI
Neg.
VDI250
Net
VDI251
7 CO 60.0 2.1 58.0 
8 TX 58.7 - 58.4 
9 IN 55.6 - 55.6 
10 OH 50.8 2.0 48.7 
11 PA 50.5 6.3 44.2 
12 GA 50.5 - 50.5 
13 RI 50.4 - 50.4 
14 NV 50.2 - 50.2 
15 ME 50.0 - 50.0 
16 FL 42.2 1.3 40.9 
17 IL 40.0 1.7 38.3 
18 MI 39.3 3.8 35.5 
19 MN 38.2 1.0 37.2 
20 KY 33.7 - 33.7 
21 LA 33.7 - 33.7 
22 TN 33.3 - 33.3 
23 MA 32.7 - 32.7 
24 CA 32.5 - 31.9 
25 WA 32.3 2.3 30.0 
26 NY 29.7 0.2 29.5 
27 SC 28.9 - 28.9 
28 AL 28.8 - 28.8 
29 NJ 27.0 2.1 24.9 
30 UT 26.8 - 26.8 
31 KS 25.6 0.4 25.2 
32 CT 25.2 5.9 19.3 
33 MS 25.0 - 25.0 
34 AR 24.9 - 24.9 
35 OK 20.2 - 20.2 
36 OR 19.5 0.2 19.3 
37 AZ 12.1 1.9 10.2 
250 See supra notes 169, 182, 187. 
251 See supra notes 169, 182, 187. 
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Rank State VDI
Neg.
VDI252
Net
VDI253
38 NE 1.8 1.6 0.2 
39 HI - - 0 
39 IA - - 0 
39 ID - - 0 
39 NH - - 0 
39 WV - - 0 
39 AK - - 0 
39 DE - - 0 
39 MT - - 0 
39 ND - - 0 
39 SD - - 0 
39 WY - - 0 
39  VT - - 0 
252 See supra notes 169, 182, 187. 
253 See supra notes 169, 182, 187. 
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